

Gulf Humanitarianism in Flux

Arab Gulf Development Actors and their Development
Policy Engagement – Backgrounds, Interests, Strategies and
Potential for Cooperation

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


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Executive Summary

- › **The Gulf monarchies Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Kuwait have emerged as significant international and regional providers of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation for decades.** By promoting humanitarianism in different regions and sectors, the leaderships of the specific Gulf monarchies aim to follow particular geostrategic interests by gaining leverage and consolidating their power position.
- › **Hence, the provision of grants, budget support or concessional loans for partner governments of political relevance has become a fundamental pillar of the Gulf monarchies' power projection.** For them, the respective state and private donor and implementation organizations, such as governmental development funds, philanthropic organizations or Islamic charities, offer important instruments to exert economic, developmental, geostrategic, and social influence in relevant target regions such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia by supporting and promoting local partners. These include governments that are considered as loyal agents of the Gulf leaderships.
- › **Development assistance has served as an essential part of the Gulf monarchies' foreign policymaking since the 1960s and 1970s.** Throughout the decades, they have developed a broad network of partners by engaging in different sectors through several financing mechanisms and by following particular political, economic and security-related interests. Thus, they cannot be framed as "new donors" or "emerging donors". Instead, they have established themselves as professional partners and experts in development cooperation for decades, exhibiting a high level of expertise, knowledge, and networks.
- › **In recent years, the Gulf monarchies have considered the provision of foreign assistance and humanitarianism as relevant instruments to seek international reputation and credibility.** Therefore, they are aiming at moving closer to standards of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) by aligning with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and providing more transparent data and statistics about their official development assistance (ODA). In doing so, Gulf monarchies have extended their partnership models and alliances with international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) through earmarked funding for specific programmes and core funding to a lesser extent.

- › **While in the past most Gulf Arab donors were mostly involved in humanitarian emergency and disaster relief, they are increasingly diversifying their development policies.** In this regard, financial investments in infrastructure are linked with capacity development (CD), training measures and youth and female empowerment as they are identified as drivers for socio-economic development in crisis-torn countries. After the so-called “Arab Spring”, the monarchies started to consider the socio-economic instability across the region as a fundamental challenge for their own legitimacy and power. Hence, foreign aid policies have started to focus more on job creation, resilience, and economic development. This complex transformation process has accelerated in times of COVID-19.
- › **Despite similar political motivations and instruments, development cooperation differs from Gulf monarchy to Gulf monarchy.** Oftentimes, financing mechanisms, partnership models, and the volume and recipients of assistance are non-transparent and politically extremely sensitive. The Gulf leaderships consider their aid policymaking as an extended arm of their security and foreign policymaking, which causes a dilemma: On the one hand, Gulf monarchies are interested in improving data provision in order to present themselves as reliable and trustworthy partners in international development policies. On the other hand, aid still serves as an instrument for national power projection.
- › **Recently, aid policies in the Gulf monarchies are undergoing significant recalibration and modification.** In general, we see a shift from mainly financial aid towards more technical and long-term development assistance, reflected in more engagement in sectors such as education, vocational training, and capacity development.
- › **German and European political and developmental stakeholders should consider closer development cooperation with the Gulf monarchies as a potential chance to improve multilateral donor coordination.** As global challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic, flight and migration, climate change or questions of sustainable employment increase, closer exchange and intensified cooperation with Gulf Arab donors could lead to better coordination and synergy effects. All Gulf States are now committed to the SDGs, have joined the OECD-DAC and are promoting cooperation with international partners such as the UN or coordinating in multilateral forums such as the Arab Coordination Group (ACG).

- › **In times of the Russian war on Ukraine, tectonic shifts in the global distribution of power are intensifying.** The hedging strategy of specific Gulf monarchies to take a rather neutral position in global politics causes political concerns in Germany, Europe, and the West. As Saudi Arabia and the UAE are mainly following a nationalistic approach and have established closer political, economic, and security ties with Russia and China, they are considered as turning away from their traditional partners in the West and taking a more independent position. As a consequence, strategic partnerships, such as between Saudi Arabia and the United States, are under strain. Therefore, closer cooperation in development assistance on a global and bilateral level could help to build bridges in times of contestation and alienation by enhancing political dialogue through humanitarianism. In this regard, trilateral and multilateral cooperation should be considered as an opportunity to re-establish trust and credibility.

- › **On the German foreign policy side, there have only been a few direct points of contact with Gulf Arab decision-makers from politics, business, or society.** As a result, on the one hand, there is often no comprehensive knowledge about the logic of action and, on the other hand, political influence remains low. Closer cooperation at the political and technical level in development assistance could thus push political dialogue. Despite the fact that Gulf monarchies appreciate and value Germany as a relevant player, other donors enjoy higher strategic and developmental priority.

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List of abbreviations

ACG	Arab Coordination Group
ADFD	Abu Dhabi Fund for Development
AGFUND	Arab Gulf Program for Development
AMF	Arab Monetary Fund
BMZ	Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CD	Capacity Development
DAAD	German Academic Exchange Service
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EAA	Education Above All
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
GNI	Gross National Income
IACAD	Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities Department and Endowments
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IIRO	International Islamic Relief Organization
ILO	International Labor Organization
IsDB	Islamic Development Bank
IUM	Islamic University Medina
KFAED	Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
KFAS	Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences
KSrelief	King Salman Center for Humanitarian Relief
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MENAFATF	Middle East and North African Financial Action Task Force
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MWL	Muslim World League

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
OFID	OPEC Fund for International Development
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
QACA	Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities
QC	Qatar Charity
QDF	Qatar Development Fund
QFFD	Qatar Fund for Development
RACA	Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities
RAF	Sheikh Thani Bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SFD	Saudi Fund for Development
SGI	Saudi Green Initiative
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
TMC	Transitional Military Council
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WAMY	World Assembly of Muslim Youth
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Introduction

The policy study “Gulf Humanitarianism in Flux: Arab Gulf Development Actors and their Development Policy Engagement – Backgrounds, Interests, Strategies and Potential for Cooperation” outlines the emergence of the Gulf monarchies Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Qatar as influential and relevant providers of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation.

Focusing on data and statistics, the Gulf monarchies’ traditional humanitarian engagement is analyzed by addressing historical trends and patterns in aid provision as well as financing mechanisms. In addition, Gulf monarchies instrumentalize development cooperation for respective political motivations aiming at preserving power projection and market access.

As the institutional landscape of development organizations is heterogenous, the study also provides an overview of the different players. In recent years, “Gulf aid” is under-going a tremendous shift from financial to technical cooperation which also slightly affects the recipients of assistance and sectors of humanitarian engagement. In addition to bilateral players, multilateral organizations have also become relevant providers of assistance and can be considered as drivers of trans-border cooperation and regional dialogue.

Finally, the study provides policy recommendations addressing chances and challenges for enhanced cooperation between Europe/Germany and Gulf monarchies in the field of humanitarianism. In the appendix, a mapping provides detailed information on the specific countries, their institutions as well as further data on Gulf monarchies’ official development assistance (ODA).

I. **Emerging donors or old players?** The Gulf monarchies as traditional developmental actors

Since the “Arab Uprisings” of 2010/2011, the Arab Gulf monarchies – in particular Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar – have emerged as the most important political actors in the Middle East region and in large parts of Africa and Asia. In the aftermath of the Arab turmoil, the so-called “Gulf moment”¹ put the oil- and gas-rich monarchies into the international spotlight. The Arab Gulf monarchies aimed to fill the power vacuum which emerged after traditional powerhouses in the Arab world such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria lost importance since 2011² due to the social and political transformation processes and military conflicts occurring in these countries. Since then, the Gulf monarchies have increasingly shaped political, social and socio-economic developments in the Arab world and beyond. Against this backdrop, they have also gained more significance in terms of humanitarianism on a regional and international level.

In recent decades, more than 75% of all non-official development assistance was pledged and disbursed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. For instance, total Saudi aid amounted to USD 90 billion or 3.7% of its annual gross domestic product (GDP) between 1975 and 2005 which was delivered to more than 157 countries. As such, Saudi Arabia has provided 5% of total assistance worldwide, making the kingdom the third-largest donor on a global level in 2021. Over time, the four Gulf monarchies have established a variety of entities as providers of financial assistance. Oftentimes framed as “donors”³ by Western entities, research institutions, political and technical stakeholders⁴, this term neglects the complex and heterogeneous contemporary portfolio of Gulf institutions’ engagement in terms of financial and technical assistance, know-how transfer and the provision of capacity development measures.

Lines between the provision of ODA and non-ODA are sometimes blurred. Against this backdrop, some statistics mentioned in this study differ from each other due to a lack of consistency in international and regional data sets. Referring to the OECD, ODA is defined as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are: provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies.”⁵ ODA is further defined as “government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.” In general, aid provision is channeled bilaterally or “through a multilateral development agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank”.⁶ Only assistance to countries included on the OECD list counts as ODA which includes 150 countries with a per capita income below USD 12,276 in 2010. The DAC list consists of 31 countries.⁷ So far, Gulf monarchies are not members of the DAC list but have become participants of the OECD-DAC in recent years (see below). Hence, not all Gulf governments are providing comprehensive data and information to the OECD-DAC as not all foreign aid is considered as ODA. Against this backdrop, significant inconsistencies exist in data provision as not all Gulf monarchies are differentiating their provision of assistance between ODA and non-ODA. For instance, the UAE are highlighting both categories in their official annual reports, but others do not which has resulted in a lack of comprehensive, eligible, and comparable data about Gulf ODA.

According to the World Bank, between 1973 and 2008 Gulf monarchies provided on average 1.5% of their gross national income (GNI) as ODA⁸, significantly exceeding the UN target of 0.7% of GNI.⁹ For decades, they gained outstanding expertise in development cooperation and were able to create excellent networks in specific regions of geostrategic interest such as in the direct Arab neighborhood (Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan), in North Africa (Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Libya), in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti), in Asia (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan) and in Europe or the Caribbean. In 2017, the UAE and Saudi Arabia ranked 7th and 8th in global international donor comparisons, while Kuwait and Qatar ranked 22nd and 20th in ODA.¹⁰ The UAE has provided on average more than 1% in ODA compared to GNI since 2013, ranking 1st in the world in 2017, followed by Kuwait (9th), Qatar (11th) and Saudi Arabia at 20th.¹¹ Between 1975 and 2011, Saudi Arabia provided over USD 65 billion in humanitarian and development assistance. In 2021, it was USD 2.1 billion of ODA, representing 0.30% of GNI.¹² The same year, the UAE disbursed USD 1.5 billion (0.4% of GNI)¹³, whereas Qatar provided USD 591.5 million of ODA in 2020 (0.42% of GNI)¹⁴ and Kuwait USD 388 million, representing 0.28% of GNI.¹⁵

Traditionally, the provision of Gulf Arab ODA has been characterized by high volatility. As the Gulf monarchies' state revenues still rely heavily on the income from oil and gas production, the willingness and capacities to provide humanitarian or development assistance have decreased in times of low oil and gas prices. For example, the ODA share in GNI in the UAE stood at 0.25% during the financial crisis of 2008/2009 but increased to 1.35% in the following year due to the rise in oil prices.¹⁶ In total, the disbursements of Gulf ODA declined by 28% between 2013 and 2017.¹⁷ A similar trend became evident at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic: In the course of significantly falling oil prices and the serious effects of the pandemic on the Gulf Arab economies (the so-called "dual shock"¹⁸), the ODA volume dropped between pre-COVID-19 2019 and 2020 from 0.24% of GDP to 0.19% in Saudi Arabia (from USD 4.8 billion in 2018 to USD 1.6 billion in 2020) and from 0.55% of GDP in the UAE to 0.48% between 2019–2020 (from USD 7.8 billion in 2018 to USD 2.8 billion in 2020).²⁰

I. Emerging donors or old players?

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- 2 Makki Hamid, *Why the World Needs Partnership with Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia's Global Humanitarian and Development Aid*, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, January 2022, <https://www.kfcris.com/en/view/post/368>.
- 3 Michele Dunne, *As Gulf Donors Shift Priorities, Arab States Search for Aid*, Carnegie Endowment, June 9, 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/09/as-gulf-donors-shift-priorities-arab-states-search-for-aid-pub-82001>.
- 4 *Development Initiatives, Non-DAC donors: Arab donors' humanitarian aid contributions, 2011*, <http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Arab-donors-humanitarian-aid.pdf>; Espen Villanger, *Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives*, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2007, <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2615-arab-foreign-aid-disbursement-patterns.pdf>.
- 5 OECD, *Official development assistance – definition and coverage*, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm>.
- 6 OECD, *Official development assistance (ODA)*, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/official-development-assistance-oda/indicator-group/english_5136f9ba-en.
- 7 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
- 8 World Bank, *Arab Development Assistance: Four Decades of Cooperation*, Quick Notes Series Number 28, August 2010, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/10919/567540BRI0Box310QuickNote281ArabODA.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.
- 9 *New Global Perspectives, The Unnoticed Heavyweights In Global Development Finance: Arab Donors*, April 22, 2021, <https://newglobalperspectives.org/unnoticed-heavyweights-in-global-development-finance-arab-donors/>.
- 10 OECD, *How Arab Countries and Institutions Finance Development, 2019*, https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/Development_finance_Arab_countries_institutions.pdf.
- 11 *Ibid.*
- 12 OECD, *Development Co-operation Profiles: Saudi Arabia, 2022*, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/b2156c99-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/5e331623en&_csp_=b14d4f60505d057b456dd1730d8fcea3&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=chapter.

- 13 OECD, **Development Co-operation Profiles: United Arab Emirates, 2022**,
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/153f7558-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/5e331623-en&_csp_=b14d4f60505d057b456dd1730d8fcea3&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=chapter.
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- 16 OECD, **How Arab Countries and Institutions Finance Development, 2019**,
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- 18 Rabah Arezki, Ha Nguyen, **Coping with a Dual Shock: COVID-19 and Oil Prices**, The World Bank, April 14, 2020,
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/brief/coping-with-a-dual-shock-coronavirus-covid-19-and-oil-prices>.
- 19 OECD, **Development Co-operation Profiles: Saudi Arabia, 2022**,
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- 20 UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, **UAE Foreign Aid Report 2020, December 2020**,
<https://www.mofaic.gov.ae/en/The-Ministry/UAE-International-Development-Cooperation/Annual-Foreign-Aid-Report>.

II. **Financing mechanisms:** Loans, grants, budget support and Islamic donations

For many years, Arab development cooperation primarily concentrated on financial assistance and humanitarian aid. The four Gulf states have been engaged in humanitarian aid in form of grants, delivery of medical goods or food items as well as budget assistance for partner governments since the 1970s.

The vast majority of development projects are financed through concessional loans. Taken together, loans from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE accounted for 59.9% of all DAC countries reporting to the OECD with a volume of USD 15.6 billion and 12.4% of contributions from DAC members with a volume of USD 126.2 billion. Loans are usually provided upon the request of the governments of recipient countries and are thus strongly demand-driven. A central requirement for the provision of such loans is the ability of the recipient government to ensure the repayment of loan installments, which is usually measured against the economic viability of the project as such.

Due to the concessional nature of most development loans, Arab financial assistance also involves a large grant element. However, pure grants are awarded only to very few countries. These are usually states that are unable to repay loans, but that need to be supported for reasons of Arab or Islamic solidarity, e.g. the Palestinian Territories, Yemen or Somalia. In a few cases, grants are also provided to countries of utmost strategic importance like Egypt, Pakistan, and Lebanon. Furthermore, budget support is provided as another financial instrument to project power in countries of utmost relevance such as Egypt or Pakistan. Arab donor organizations tend to provide budget support mainly in the form of deposits in the respective national banks to stabilize cash reserves.

A significant share of financial assistance is still provided through religious donations such as *zqat* and *sadaqa*. All Gulf monarchies consider 'Islamic charity assistance' as an important element of their wider framework of finance for development. Such aid is provided with a cultural or religious purpose or motivation, such as building mosques and homes for orphans and widows. Other support is seasonal such as contributions for Hajj pilgrims and meals during the month of Ramadan. Financial flows for religious purposes are not calculated by the OECD-DAC as ODA, but due to its domestic reputational importance, charity assistance receives a lot of local and regional media attention. For instance, Islamic donations play a significant role for Saudi Arabia, which presents itself as a religious leader as "Custodian of the Holy Shrines" Mecca and Medina.

Finally, financial assistance is contributed on a minor level to multilateral and UN organizations. Gulf countries tend to opt for ad hoc contributions to special programs rather than preferring core-funding. However, only small proportions of development assistance are channeled to multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and its various bodies such as the World Food Programme, the UN Children's Fund, or the World Health Organization. In 2020, bilateral development assistance accounted for 85.6% of Saudi Arabia's, 91.6% of Qatar's, 95.9% of Kuwait's, and 98.7% of the UAE's ODA⁴.

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III. Preserving power projection and market access: Political motivations and calculations of Gulf donors for the provision of development cooperation

The general political motivation to provide development assistance is closely connected to the three vital interests that guide the Gulf monarchies' overarching foreign policymaking.¹ These are the interest to (1) safeguard the role of the respective royal families as the only legitimate rulers, (2) preserve domestic stability and regional security, and (3) strengthen and diversify the respective economies.² As part of this general strategic approach, humanitarian assistance has developed as a relevant instrument of political power consolidation by establishing patronage networks in regions of strategic priority. Through aid provision, the Gulf leaderships seek to improve market access in times of economic diversification, preserve geostrategic interests in times of regional security deterioration and support partners of close political and ideological affiliation.³

- › *Fighting poverty and unemployment:* From the Gulf perspective, social frustration across the region poses a challenge for the monarchies' leadership model and regional stability. Thus, the Gulf monarchies intend to preserve socioeconomic stability in countries of geostrategic interest which has resulted in more engagement in sectors such as education, vocational training, job creation by financing scholarship programs, capacity development, training courses, e-learning, promotion of entrepreneurship and awareness raising campaigns.
- › *Showing solidarity with people in need:* Charity assistance through Islamic donations is considered a relevant element of Gulf monarchies' aid policies in order to present themselves as reliable, gentle and trustworthy providers of humanitarian aid to crisis-torn Muslim societies such as in the direct Arab neighborhood (Syria, Yemen), Asia or Africa. Such Islamic charity activities have been harshly criticized as religious indoctrination efforts to promote conservative and extremist Islamic interpretations driven by Wahhabi or Salafi beliefs. In particular, Saudi-based charity organizations have been accused of terror funding whereas it was also reported that Qatar entities such as Qatar Charity are providing financial aid to movements with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe.⁴
- › *Politicizing aid⁵:* The Gulf monarchies instrumentalize their development policymaking actors to realize their own interests and to gain influence in countries of geopolitical importance. Hence, foreign aid has become politicized to follow particular security- or economy-related motivations.⁶ In many areas of development policy, the Gulf States are pursuing a selective participatory approach geared towards population groups or political actors who act in the interests of the respective donor country. These include governments that are considered partners of the Gulf States for strategic or geopolitical reasons. The provision of development cooperation in various forms is seen as an instrument to ensure the partner's loyalty and to shape local political developments in the Gulf leaderships' interests. Budget support, energy supplies and deposits in respective central banks of such partner countries account for a significant proportion of foreign Gulf aid. Against this backdrop, Gulf monarchies do not show strategic interest in promoting political participation or

democratization as they fear regional spill-over effects and destabilization which could also cause harm for their monarchical leadership models. The provision of assistance to non-democratic actors became obvious during the “Arab Uprisings” when the status quo powers Saudi Arabia and the UAE supported the coup d`état in Egypt or the anti-Islamist counter-revolution in Tunisia.⁷ For instance, the Egyptian government under President Abd Al-Fattah as-Sisi is said to have received USD 12 billion from Saudi Arabia, while the UAE is said to have supported Egypt with a total of USD 20 billion between 2013 and 2019. A similar approach became obvious at the Horn of Africa: Since the start of the war in Yemen, this region has been considered the strategic hinterland of this conflict for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to a lesser extent.⁸ In order to forge multilateral alliances against the Houthis in Yemen, Saudi Arabia exerted pressure on individual governments in the countries on the Horn of Africa: Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia subsequently joined the Saudi-led military alliance. For example, Sudan sent between 10,000⁹ and 30,000 soldiers and militias¹⁰ to support the kingdom in Yemen. In return for the deployment in Yemen, Saudi Arabia disbursed financial support, such as the deposit of USD 1 billion in the Sudanese central bank in 2015.¹¹ After the coup d`état against Omar al-Bashir in 2019¹² and the power grab of the Sudanese army in October 2021¹³, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supported the Transitional Military Council (TMC) with USD 3 billion¹⁴ and economic assistance.¹⁵ In doing so, the Sudanese strongmen General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan und General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”) received incentives to continue their military support in Yemen.¹⁶ In turn, the close ties between the autocratic leaders and the Gulf monarchies created inner-Sudanese tensions and resulted in political and social polarization.¹⁷ In such cases, politically motivated engagement is intensified through the strategic provision of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, which fuels “proxy conflicts” and excludes disadvantaged groups from receiving aid.

- › *Counter-balancing regional rivals:* In particular, regional rivals such as Iran or Turkey should be weakened with such financial contributions. Hence, the provision of funding is oftentimes unconditional and more attractive for many partners than the support of the international community linked to specific objectives. During the so-called “Gulf rift”¹⁸ from 2017 to 2021, humanitarian engagement was also politicized by the UAE and Saudi Arabia to undermine Qatar’s political ties with several countries at the Horn of Africa.¹⁹
- › *Promoting economic diversification:* Gulf monarchies seek to foster economic diversification through development assistance. Therefore, new markets need to be entered in order to develop economic partnerships, improve business and investment opportunities as well as trade volumes. Against this backdrop, Gulf monarchies are particularly interested to invest in agricultural infrastructure to preserve food security or in maritime infrastructure and logistics in African and Asian countries. In political terms, partner countries are expected to receive something in return based on political loyalty and econo-

mic advantages such as access to attractive market segments and geostrategic relevant infrastructure such as in maritime logistics. The Gulf monarchies need to diversify their economies still relying on fossil resources. Against this backdrop, new partnerships have been established abroad in order to secure the Gulf monarchies' business model, open up sales markets and strengthen trade alliances. To this end, the Gulf monarchies primarily use the instrument of financial assistance and budget support as well as investments in the infrastructure.

- › *Promoting nation branding:* Through the provision of humanitarian aid, the Gulf monarchies aim to establish a positive image on the national, regional, and international level. For decades, Gulf leaderships did not show much interest to publicly highlight their humanitarian efforts as the provision of aid is mainly considered as an individual obligation to meet religious expectations rather than gain public attention. However, Gulf monarchies are now more interested to present their efforts to a global audience as such engagement should help to win reputation. As part of this nation branding, multilateral and international coordination has become a top priority of Gulf monarchies which is indicated by the fact that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have already become members of the OECD-DAC.
- › *Promoting climate action and environmental protection:* The Gulf monarchies are engaging more comprehensively in efforts on climate action and environmental protection in order to fight climate change and natural disasters such as floods, typhoons, or sandstorms.²⁰ Serious water scarcity, high carbon emissions and energy consumption feature prominently in the public and political discourse of the Gulf monarchies and has resulted in ambitious initiatives such as the Saudi Green Initiative (SGI)²¹ or national goals to reach carbon-free emissions in next decades. In the UAE, the next climate conference COP28 is taking place in November/December 2023²², whereas Saudi Arabia aims to establish itself as a regional hub for green and blue hydrogen.²³ Saudi Arabia²⁴, Kuwait²⁵, Qatar²⁶ and the UAE²⁷ signed the Paris Agreement of 2016. The Kyoto Protocol was also ratified by Bahrain in 2006, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2005.²⁸ Hereby, they are increasingly involved in the expansion of renewable energies and have become members in some committees and forums of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).²⁹ The Regional Cooperation Center was founded in Dubai in 2019³⁰ in cooperation with UN Climate Change and the World Green Economy Organization to advance the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol in the areas of research, policy dialogue and capacity development. Furthermore, multilateral donor organizations and national implementing agencies have included green projects related to renewable energy and climate action. For instance, the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) has launched its Climate Policy & Action Plan in 2019.³¹

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IV. **Key players of Gulf development cooperation:** A heterogenous group of actors

The landscape of developmental actors in the Gulf states is very diverse and the engagement in terms of development and humanitarian assistance of their respective actors is often not transparent. A large number of bilateral, semi-private, philanthropic and multilateral donor and implementation organizations in the Gulf monarchies have developed which shows the complex landscape of Gulf aid in terms of institutions and stakeholders.¹ In principle, four main institutional actors can be identified: While the state development funds provide their partners with financial support at the bilateral level, semi-state, Islamic or private welfare organizations or foundations act as relevant implementation organizations. They form the core of Gulf Arab development policy and are largely involved at the local and national level, but also at the regional level. Within this group, however, a distinction must be made between traditional Islamic welfare organizations and a newly formed group of semi-private institutions that do not necessarily see their humanitarian aid as a religious duty, but instead present themselves as more secular development actors who are increasingly active in the sustainable education sector, other target groups address and work together with international partners. Those actors refer to the SDGs.

Selected institutions of Gulf development assistance and humanitarian aid

	Saudi Arabia	Kuwait	UAE	Qatar
Governmental organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) › King Salman Center for Humanitarian Relief (KSrelief) › Saudi Red Crescent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) › Kuwait Red Crescent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) › UAE Red Crescent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) › Qatar Red Crescent
Selected Islamic charities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Muslim World League (MWL) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › International Islamic Charity Organization (IICO) › Zakat House 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Qatar Charity
Private or semi-private philanthropic organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Al Waleed bin Talal Foundation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences (KFAS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum Global Initiative (MBRGI) › Dubai Cares › All Ghurayr Foundation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Qatar Foundation › Education Above All › Silatech
Multilateral organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) › Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AMF) › Arab Gulf Programme for Development (AGFUND) › Arab Monetary Fund (AFESD) › Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) › OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) 			

Governmental organizations

The governmental development funds are the most important donors in all four Gulf States. They include the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD), the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD), the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD). They have the political mandate of their respective governments to disburse official financial resources to countries of relevance and to finance projects in different sectors in cooperation with implementing partners on a national and international level. For decades, those entities must be defined as essential instruments of Gulf regional and foreign policymaking. KFAED was founded in 1961, making it the oldest Gulf donor agency. The ADFD followed in 1971, and the SFD in 1974², while Qatar only founded the first state development agency, the Qatar Development Fund (QDF)³, in 2002, which, however, only went into operational business in 2015 under the name QFFD. In recent years, the leaderships in the respective Gulf monarchies have initiated a restructuring process of the state institutions, which has also led to a higher level of professionalism, efficiency and accountability in the development agencies. They have recruited more international technical expertise but remain dependent on the decision-making power of political leadership.⁴

In addition to these traditional organizations, other state organizations have emerged in recent years. They perform similar tasks to the development funds but are even more closely linked to the respective leaderships. The most outstanding example of such actors is the King Salman Center for Humanitarian Relief (KSrelief) of Saudi Arabia, which was established in 2015 under King Salman (ruled since January 2015). Since then, KSrelief has emerged as the champion of Saudi humanitarian aid and increasingly of technical cooperation. Originally, KSrelief served the Saudi government as the main driver for its humanitarian aid provision to Yemen. Since the beginning of the Saudi-led military intervention against the Houthis in March 2015, Saudi Arabia's leadership intended to establish closer networks to international organizations, present itself as a partner in humanitarianism and show solidarity with the crisis-torn Yemeni population. KSrelief explicitly outlined that assistance was also provided to areas occupied by the Houthis in order to prevent the impression of acting biased and partisan. Today, KSrelief is active in numerous other countries such as in Asia or Africa. Somalia has emerged as the fifth largest recipient of KSrelief's aid with a volume of USD 221 million, followed by the Asian countries Pakistan with USD 160 million, Indonesia with USD 73 million and Afghanistan with USD 39 million.⁵

With KSrelief, the Saudi leadership under King Salman and his son, powerful Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, wanted to achieve two main goals: First, Saudi Arabia aims to professionalize and harmonize humanitarian aid policy. So far, a variety of Islamic charities and other organizations has been active in the kingdom's humanitarian aid. By establishing KSrelief, such heterogenous donor landscape has been centralized under the control of the Saudi leadership – similar to other centralization efforts driven by the ambitious goals to promote socio-economic transformation as outlined in "Vision 2030".⁶ By monopolizing Saudi aid policies, the leadership also aims to consolidate political power and gain more leverage on the once heterogenous Saudi aid system.

Second, the crown prince wants to improve his image, which has suffered drastically from the war in Yemen⁷, the assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi⁸, and the imprisonment of Saudi human rights activists.⁹ Against this background, KSrelief has established itself as a reliable and respected partner for the international community and cooperates closely with UN organizations, many bilateral donor organizations such as USAID or the British Department for International Development and Islamic aid organizations such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Muslim World League (MWL) and the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO).¹⁰ By October 2022, KSrelief has implemented 2,169 projects in 86 partner countries with a total volume of more than USD 5.9 billion. Main beneficiary countries are Yemen with 759 projects with a volume of USD 4.1 billion, followed by the Palestinian Territories (108 projects with a volume of USD 370 million) and Syrian refugees (267 projects with a volume of USD 340 million). Main sectors of KSrelief's humanitarian engagement are food security (727 projects with a volume of USD 1.88 billion), health (709 projects with a volume of USD 1.1 billion) and humanitarian aid (53 projects with a volume of USD 860 million).¹¹

Islamic welfare organizations

Islamic welfare organizations play an indispensable but also often controversial role in the humanitarian aid policy of the Gulf monarchies.¹² They consider those institutions as another driver for power consolidation.¹³ Furthermore, they have emerged as relevant actors in inner-Gulf competition and rivalry as became obvious during the "Gulf rift" from 2017 to 2021: At that time, the blockading quartet accused specific Qatari charities such as Qatar Charity, the Sheikh Eid al-Thani Charity Foundation (Eid Charity) and the Sheikh Thani Bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services (RAF) to support Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood¹⁴ or Hamas on behalf of the Qatari government.¹⁵

Religious donations continue to function as a traditional means of Gulf Arab development cooperation. As a sign of Islamic solidarity with societies in need, the provision of alms on an individual, collective and institutional level is of paramount importance and is one of the five Islamic duties. Charitable assistance in the form of alms donations (zakat and sadaqa) are considered an Islamic obligation to show individual and collective solidarity with those in need and to meet one's own responsibility as a pious Muslim. Islamic foundations manage and operationalize such alms giving and pass it on to partners in the respective recipients, who use it to build mosques, provide relief services such as food and medical supply in crisis-torn countries, or support orphans and widows. Islamic aid is collected through national fundraising campaigns and made available through Islamic foundations, especially during the fasting month of Ramadan. In contrast to the governmental development organizations, these foundations have for a long time acted quite independently and autonomously from state control. Islamic charities thus succeeded in building opaque and complex transnational networks with partners in neighboring Arab countries, but also in Europe, Asia and Africa. First and foremost, these organizations see themselves as supporters of those in need of help in the Islamic community (umma). The

Islamic donation culture is therefore not only considered as a personal duty in all Gulf monarchies, but also as an expression of state-led religious responsibility and thus as part of national identity. Fundraising campaigns serve as an important cultural driving force in the Gulf societies, especially during the annual Hajj pilgrimage and Ramadan aiming at expressing solidarity with deprived groups in other Islamic countries. Such campaigns are often initiated by a call from the respective rulers. Ideologically, numerous charities across the Islamic world¹⁶ are inspired by conservative Islamic interpretations such as Salafism or Wahhabism with its origins in Saudi Arabia.¹⁷ Such entities have emerged as relevant providers of social and religious services in theatres of conflict such as in Lebanon¹⁸ or Pakistan.¹⁹ The less the respective governments can provide social security, the more Salafist and Islamist actors established themselves as important alternatives. With the support of donations from the Gulf, Salafists managed not only to create a transnational network, but also political dependencies and exert political influence.²⁰ In the meantime, most foundations are active worldwide and are increasingly involved in Muslim countries in Africa, Europe and Asia, but also in non-Muslim regions such as in Latin America or the Caribbean.

The influence of the foundations is based more on individual and transnational networks and less on institutionalized partnerships: prominent male preachers from the Gulf monarchies correspond with colleagues from other recipient countries, organize joint teaching seminars and exchange trips and meet for religious discussions in private circles, which are particularly prominent in Kuwait and serve as important forums for a transnational network of religious actors.²¹ Arab students came into close contact with Salafist teachings at influential universities such as the Saudi Islamic University Medina (IUM) and exported them to their home countries, where they subsequently often shaped, built and inspired the local Salafist scene.²² The personal relationships with their former teachers in Saudi Arabia continued and formed the basis for a loose, supra-regional network based on trustworthy personal ties.²² However, the Salafist movements and the Islamic foundations in all the Gulf monarchies such as in Saudi Arabia²⁴ or Kuwait²⁵ went through different developments, faced different challenges, were either co-opted, instrumentalized or marginalized by the state. Saudi foundations in particular were accused of spreading purist and ultra-orthodox ideas of Islam in the Islamic world.²⁶ By building mosques and Qur'an schools, sending preachers and distributing copies of the Qur'an, these actors have played a prominent role in Saudi proselytization efforts in recent decades.²⁷

While concerns about the opaque activities of Islamic charities and welfare organizations may be legitimate²⁸ and "secular northern humanitarians often assume that faith-based acts of assistance are ill-placed to implement humanitarian neutrality and impartiality"²⁹, it cannot be denied that regional governments have already introduced strict legislation in order to better control funding to partners and private donations to Islamic charities:³⁰ Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, all four Gulf monarchies are moving towards a highly centralized, state-supervised, and increasingly politicized charity sector as they are often portrayed as carrying the potential of being "promoters of development aid, capable of galvanizing moral commitment, translating principles of aid into the idioms of faith, and mobilizing popular support for donor initiatives".³¹

Since international pressure on Gulf governments has been increased in the aftermath of the terror attacks of 9/11, Gulf monarchies have introduced stricter regulations to control foreign funding and prevent financing of extremists, Islamists, or jihadists.³² In 2003, as part of the Middle East and North African Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF)³³, the Gulf monarchies and ten other Arab states agreed on stricter control mechanisms to monitor the financial flows from Islamic foundations to beneficiaries abroad. Since 2004, the Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA) and since 2014 the successor organization Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities (RACA) have been responsible for registering Qatari charitable organizations.³⁴ Similarly, Saudi Arabia has established the National Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad in 2005³⁵ in order to better monitor Saudi charities. As part of this regulation process, the Al-Haramain Foundation was closed in 2004.³⁶ Under Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, Islamic proselytizing through Wahhabi foundations has been further lost in relevance. Instead, he promotes Saudi nationalism and called for a "return to moderate Islam"³⁷, which limits the influence of orthodox Wahhabi foundations abroad. In the UAE, the General Authority of Islamic Affairs and Endowments and the Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities Department and Endowments (IACAD)³⁸ are responsible for the official registration of UAE-located charities. Finally, Kuwait's Ministry for Social Affairs and Labor oversees the control and registration of Islamic charities but until 2013, no strict legal restrictions of foreign funding did exist.³⁹

Despite these stricter control mechanisms, there are still deficits in information on the number of foundations in the Gulf monarchies and their private donors in all Gulf monarchies. Therefore, Islamic charities are still a black box in Gulf monarchies' humanitarianism. They also pose a delicate challenge for the respective leaderships. On the one hand, they aim to better control non-transparent financial flows to counter-balance radicalism and terrorism. On the other hand, Islamic charities are still an integral part of Gulf monarchies' humanitarianism.

Private or semi-private philanthropic organizations

Alongside such governmental organizations, numerous semi-private philanthropic and welfare organizations funded by private donations, business tycoons or members of the respective ruling families form an integral part of the multifaceted Gulf aid landscape. Interesting examples of such entities are Education Above All (EAA) and Silatech in Qatar or Dubai Cares in the UAE. They refer to international principles of universalism by showing commitment to the SDGs and are seeking partnerships with international organizations or on a bilateral level. Those institutions are aiming to support entrepreneurship, academic research, small and medium enterprises (SME) and other private businesses by providing vocational training, training equipment or capacity development. They are further engaged in primary school education, developing curricula, providing technical devices, offering online education and scholarships. Accordingly, their organizational structure must thus be described as a hybrid model, since they describe themselves as private non-governmental organizations, but are usually closely intertwined with governmental institutions or the ruling families. This is particularly evident in the composition of the respective governing bodies, which are mostly made

up of members of the royal families or high-ranking technocrats. Prominent examples include the Saudi business mogul and member of the Al Saud, Prince Alwalid bin Talal who has founded Alwaleed Philanthropies⁴⁰, and Sheikha Mosa al Misnad, wife of the former Qatari Emir Hamad Al Thani, the founder of EAA⁴¹ and Silatech.⁴²

Towards a new understanding of developmentalism: Shifting the sectoral focus and instruments of Gulf development cooperation

Altogether, four sectors account for 59% of total ODA from the Gulf monarchies. This includes the transport sector with 25%, the energy sector with 17%, agriculture with 9% and the water and waste-water sector with 8%. Although the state development funds are still concentrating on projects in these sectors, they are expanding their portfolio and are increasingly involved in the provision of health services such as the construction of medical infrastructure or financial support for vaccine development. Such engagement is mainly driven by the COVID-19 pandemic as Gulf monarchies want to present themselves as reliable actors in health and vaccination diplomacy.⁴³

Furthermore, project promotion in environmental issues such as climate action and disaster protection have emerged as new sectors of Gulf development cooperation. The need for economic diversification has pushed Gulf governments to expand their humanitarian engagement in "green developmentalism" or "greening oil money"⁴⁴ which has resulted in the launch of interesting funding programs and initiatives that focus on capacity development at home and abroad. Therefore, Gulf development cooperation policies are undergoing fundamental recalibrations and shifts in terms of sectors and techniques. As such, Gulf-based philanthropic organizations founded by members of the ruling families or influential businesspeople are mostly focusing on the education and training sector, providing scholarship programs for females and youth. Although development sovereign wealth funds still largely focus on providing financial assistance in various forms, private or philanthropic organizations in particular are turning towards more technical cooperation. However, in contrast to the state development funds, these institutions only have fewer financial resources at their disposal, which is why in most cases they are reliant on co-financing provided by the cooperation partners.

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V. Regions of engagement: The direct neighborhood, Africa, and externalization of aid for Syrian refugees

Main focus is still on the MENA region. Traditionally, Gulf development cooperation focuses on target countries in the Near and Middle East. In particular, neighboring countries such as Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, the Palestinian Territories and geostrategic relevant partners such as Pakistan, Sudan or Ethiopia receive a large proportion of financial and technical assistance. Between 2013 and 2017, 34% of Gulf Arab support went to Egypt¹, largely due to massive financial contributions from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which backed the new government after al-Sisi came to power in June 2013.² 11% of Gulf development cooperation was allocated to Yemen. Humanitarian assistance from Saudi Arabia increased significantly after the beginning of the Saudi-led military intervention in March 2015: Between 2015 and October 2022, humanitarian assistance for Yemen increased to more than USD 4.2 billion³, while between 2008 and 2014 it was only USD 116.9 million. The concentration on aid disbursements to Yemen in recent years is an outstanding example of the close interlinkages between Gulf aid policy and strategic and security-related political motivations. Other important recipient countries between 2013 and 2017 were the two non-Gulf monarchies Morocco with 8.7% and Jordan with 6.6%. In both cases, assistance was channeled in order to stabilize both monarchies, which had come under significant domestic political pressure after the outbreak of the “Arab Uprisings” in 2010/2011.

Top 10 recipient countries of Gulf Arab assistance from 2013–2017




Figure 1 – Source: OECD, *How Arab countries and institutions finance development*, 2020. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

Assistance for Syrian refugees has decreased in recent years. Support for Syrian refugees in the host countries of Jordan, Lebanon and, in the case of Qatar, Turkey also increased since the beginning of the Syrian military conflict.⁴ Whereas the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have been engaged heavily in providing relief to Syrian refugees located in Lebanon or Jordan, Qatar focused more on its engagement on Turkey as both countries enjoyed close relations in recent years.⁵ Most of the humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees has been channeled through governmental developmental funds, the Red Crescent organizations and Islamic charities. By the end of 2015, the Gulf States had provided a total of USD 2.3 billion in aid for Syrian refugees in the host countries and for the United Nations⁶ whereas 90% of the funding was provided by either European governments or the United States.⁷ Despite such high pledges, disbursements have been significantly lower which poses one of the main challenges of Gulf aid towards Syrian refugees: With the exception of Kuwait, other Gulf monarchies have only sporadically and to a lesser extent fulfilled their announced payment commitments in recent years. For instance, only 17.5% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon received the necessary benefits requested by the UN in 2020, while in Jordan and Turkey 15.4% and 7% of the intended assistance had been disbursed respectively.⁸ Their assistance for Syrian refugees was part of the Gulf monarchies' double strategy by presenting themselves as reliable international actors and supporters of Syrian "brothers and sisters" and by externalizing aid to prevent the influx of Syrian refugees into their countries. Thus, Gulf monarchies have chosen a "Charity First, Refugees Second" approach.⁹

Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has gained a new momentum in recent years. In addition to the direct Arab neighborhood, Sub-Saharan Africa has gained more importance in Gulf ODA in recent years. Particular in the course of the Gulf crisis, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand and Qatar on the other tried to expand their influence in target countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa by instrumentalizing humanitarian aid and development assistance in order to promote power projection and counterbalance the influence of their respective rivals. Such a "politization of aid" led to local polarization, fueled regional fault lines and undermined social cohesion in fragile contexts such as Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Mali, Djibouti and Ethiopia. The most important recipient of aid from the Gulf monarchies in the Horn of Africa between 2013 and 2017 was Sudan with a volume of USD 202 million.¹⁰ As a consequence, the Gulf monarchies count among the largest donors in terms of budgets and number of projects carried out in Sub-Saharan Africa. The main sectors of development cooperation activities are agriculture and rural development, energy, as well as transportation, infrastructure, and logistics. In recent years, the activities of the Gulf states also extended in West African countries. These priorities can be explained with policies of securing supply chains and geopolitical economic and ideational interests of the Gulf monarchies. Similarly, Gulf-based or largely Gulf-driven multilateral donor organizations – the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), IsDB, the OPEC Fund for International Development, and the Arab Gulf Program for Development (AGFUND) – are also active in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Engagement of bilateral donors in Sub-Saharan Africa

	UAE	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	Kuwait
Main target countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Ethiopia › Mali › Somalia › Sudan › Chad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Sudan › Somalia › Mali 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Sudan › Mauritania › Senegal › Mali › Guinea › Somalia › Ethiopia › Mauritius › Cameroon › The Gambia › Chad › Djibouti 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Sudan › Senegal › Djibouti › Chad › Ethiopia
Sectors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › budgetary support › social welfare services › housing sector and administration › medical services › rural development › transport › health › electricity and water 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › budgetary support › education › development projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › transportation › energy › agriculture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › infrastructure › energy › agriculture › water and sewage sector

Table 2 – Source: OECD, *How Arab countries and institutions finance development*, 2019. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

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VI. Bilateralism versus multilateralism: Gulf monarchies as “ATMs” for aid?

Gulf ODA is mainly provided on a bilateral level whereas support for multilateral organizations remained minimal in recent years. In Kuwait, the share of gross bilateral ODA channeled through multilateral organizations in terms of earmarked contributions was USD 37.6 million or only 0.7% in 2020. Almost 50% of its multilateral disbursements were provided to the World Bank, 27.1% to the United Nations and 9% to other UN funds and programmes with a focus on core contributions to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) with USD 5.3 million, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) with USD 3.4 million, and the UN Secretariat with USD 3.3 million.¹ In Saudi Arabia, almost USD 800 million of gross ODA went to the multilateral system in 2020 with a majority of 60.2% earmarked to specific programmes and regions. 80% of the disbursements was provided to the UN and their respective programmes (59%) such as the World Food Programme (WFP) with USD 148.8 million or the World Health Organization (WHO) with USD 55.6 million and other multilateral organizations with 21.2% such as GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance.² Only 7% of the UAE's gross bilateral ODA was channeled through multilateral organizations whereas 1.3% was provided as core funding to multilateral organizations in 2020 (USD 24.6 million). Most of the contributions went to the World Bank (39.4%), UN entities (30.9%) such as the WHO (USD 12.5 million) or the WFP (USD 9.7 million) and other multilateral organizations (22.3%), such as the Global Partnership for Education.³ Qatar's share of gross bilateral ODA channeled through multilateral organizations was 16.8% in 2020 whereas 8.4% of total ODA were allocated as core contributions to multilateral institutions. In total, thus, 25.2% of ODA was disbursed on a multilateral level which is a significant increase compared to 11.3% in 2019. With 60.1%, most of the multilateral contributions were allocated for the UN with a special focus on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with USD 28.7 million, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) with USD 15.6 million and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with USD 15 million.⁴

As those statistics show, core funding to UN organizations seems to be considered as a double-edged sword for Gulf monarchies. Whereas Kuwait is traditionally more engaged in multilateral partnerships, in other Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia mistrust in UN organizations and their respective project implementation procedures has increased. For instance, the Saudi leadership blamed the UN organizations active in Yemen for allegedly providing the Houthis with financial assistance. Furthermore, Saudi representatives also criticized that the kingdom is not officially authorized to participate in certain decision-making formats and platforms. Instead of the UN interest to engage with Saudi Arabia on an eye-level in terms of project coordination and implementation, the kingdom is mainly considered as a provider of financial contributions, Saudi interlocutors complained. Such an imbalanced partnership has resulted in the impression that Gulf monarchies are only serving as "ATMs"⁵. As a consequence, UN organizations are sometimes accused of post-colonial Western instruments of power projection rather than reliable and respected partners. Thus, bilateral cooperation is still preferred by Gulf development organizations.

Despite existing mistrust in UN agencies, multilateral cooperation serves as a driver to improve international reputation and nation branding. Gulf monarchies consider development cooperation on a multilateral level as a relevant opportunity to present themselves as reliable and trustworthy partners. By aligning with and referring to the SDGs, by providing core or ear-marked funding to UN organizations and by establishing partnerships with a variety of international providers of development assistance, they frame and brand their humanitarian engagement in a more universalist way. Their respective developmental organizations thus present themselves as players that follow international guidelines and have declared them to be the guidelines for their own actions. In particular, there is growing cooperation with the UN and other multilateral organizations such as GAVI in times of COVID-19. Based on such political considerations, the Gulf monarchies have professionalized and centralized their development policies in recent years. This is reflected in more commitment and seriousness to publish comprehensive statistics in order to improve multilateral cooperation and international reputation.

In this regard, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have become members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD Development Assistance Committee, OECD-DAC) which has at large contributed to a more comprehensive visibility and transparency in data provision. The OECD-DAC has been collaborating with Arab countries and institutions since the 1960s and identifies them as key partners in the context of its Global Relations Strategy. The UAE became the first DAC participant in 2014, followed by Qatar in 2016 as well as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 2018. The countries thus can participate in all meetings of the DAC which are not subject to confidentiality but are excluded from formal decisions and cannot take the chair. By becoming participants, the Gulf countries seek to render their spending comparable to DAC donors. Along with this status, though, also comes the expectation that the countries report comprehensively to the DAC. However, it should be noted that reliable data available on Arab development cooperation is comparatively limited. As not all Gulf monarchies give account of their development activities in a comprehensive manner, a precise assessment of the contributions made by them is rather difficult.

Participation of Gulf monarchies in OECD-DAC

2014	UAE
2016	Qatar
2018	Saudi Arabia
2018	Kuwait

Table 3 – Source: OECD, How Arab countries and institutions finance development, 2019. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

Oftentimes, Gulf monarchies do not differentiate between governmental, individual and private aid provision. Against the background that the state usually provides a large part of the ODA, but philanthropic and government-related foundations also receive private Islamic donations (sadaqa and zakat) that are not listed as official ODA, it is difficult to comprehensively assess and monitor the total volume of Gulf assistance. Furthermore, some Gulf monarchies such as the UAE have criticized that Islamic aid in terms of donations is not defined as ODA which significantly reduces the Gulf share of ODA. In turn, a serious discussion has been intensified even among international organizations how to deal with Islamic aid in the future.⁶ Hence, mutual dissatisfactions exist on both sides as cooperation still lacks contingency. While the UAE is described as an exemplary partner, Qatar and Saudi Arabia still fail to provide consistent and eligible data. On the Qatari and Saudi side, these shortcomings are not necessarily attributed to a lack of political commitment, but to limited personal capacities and insufficient experience.

Inner-Gulf competition and pragmatism: Development cooperation as a forum for regional dialogue

On a regional level, the Arab Coordination Group (ACG) serves as the main platform for inner-Gulf dialogue and cooperation on a developmental level. The group consists of ten bilateral and multilateral institutions and has even continued its meetings in times of inner-Gulf political tensions as became obvious during the so-called “Gulf rift” from June 2017 until January 2021 when the “blockading quartet” Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt isolated Qatar. Interestingly, even in such a period of high polarization, defamation and demonization among the Gulf leaderships, QFFD was not suspended from ACG meetings and bilateral training and CD measures between the SFD and QFFD took place. Despite inner-Gulf political tensions, the national and multilateral development cooperation organizations are pursuing a pragmatic approach and coordinating their ODA among themselves.

Member Organizations of the Arab Coordination Group

Bilateral members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) › Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) › Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) › Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD)
Multilateral members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) › Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AMF) › Arab Gulf Programme for Development (AGFUND) › Arab Monetary Fund (AFESD) › Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) › OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)

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VII. Chances for enhanced cooperation

The Arab donors are by no means a monolithic bloc. Specialized governmental bilateral organizations with outstanding experience in financing infrastructure projects exist for decades whereas bilateral organizations mostly active in technical cooperation have only recently emerged. Since global crises have intensified due to climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy shortages accelerated by the Ukraine war, both sides still intend to promote political dialogue in order to enhance project implementation in priority sectors and target regions of mutual interest. Against this backdrop, new opportunities for closer cooperation with Germany's developmentalism could emerge driven by the need to create synergy effects in terms of know-how transfer, financing, and networks.

Despite the deficient framework conditions, German development cooperation has been able to demonstrate clear successes in cooperation with Arab donors. It is thus considered with high respect by Arab donors and in the international donor community and is regarded as a pioneer. In terms of bilateral Gulf organizations, Qatar has shown significant interest in cooperation with Germany. In particular, institutions such as the QFFD, Silatech, and EAA have entered a long-term exchange with German developmental actors such as the GIZ, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and representatives from the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in order to promote concrete project implementation. As the Gulf monarchies are undergoing fundamental socio-economic transformation, they are interested to improve international development partnerships which increases the chances for German-Gulf cooperation.

In times of the Ukraine war, Germany has to diversify political partnerships which could also result in more development cooperation with the Gulf monarchies. So far, Germany lacks a comprehensive foreign policy strategy for the Gulf monarchies.¹ Previously, cooperation with Gulf monarchies was oftentimes only seen through the lens of economic partnership rather than identifying additional policy fields. In times of energy partnership diversification and the attempt of the German government to engage more with Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, a new momentum for enhanced dialogue on development cooperation emerges. In times of a multipolar world, Germany could aim to recalibrate its development cooperation with the Gulf monarchies in order to work together on challenges of joint interest and establish a more reliable and comprehensive partnership model in which also humanitarianism and developmentalism could feature more prominently. Driven by more dialogue and exchange, such a strategy could pave the way for more realistic project implementations in sectors and countries of joint interest and a more coherent and candid communication between Germany and the Gulf monarchies. Sectors of joint interest are renewable energies such as closer cooperation in green hydrogen, sustainable energy supply, climate action, migration management, digitalization, education and vocational training, global health and health diplomacy, job creation, food security, biodiversity and mobility.

In contrast to bilateral cooperation models, cooperation with multilateral partners offers the most promising partnership opportunities. In general, the multilateral Arab organizations are less dependent on national interests and volatility and often pursue their own priorities, which facilitates joint project implementation over longer periods. For instance, the BMZ has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with IsDB in order to expand triangular cooperation. The global effects of climate change, migration, the COVID-19 pandemic, political crises and conflicts are increasing and require global solutions that can only be managed in multilateral cooperation. In this context, triangular cooperation will become more relevant in the future, which also includes organizations from partner countries of German development cooperation as equal partners in the exchange of knowledge. For instance, the IsDB has launched the “Reverse Linkage Programmes” for South-South and triangular cooperation for many years. With the “Reverse Linkage” programme line, the IsDB offers a key instrument for trilateral cooperation that largely fit with the formalities of German development cooperation in many areas. In this regard, several projects with German development actors such as the GIZ were realized including joint training courses for regional experts. The European Union (EU) is now also showing increased interest in working with the IsDB but is still at the beginning of the partnership compared to German development cooperation. Nonetheless, joint efforts with the Gulf monarchies in development cooperation and humanitarian aid are explicitly mentioned in the EU communication strategy “A strategic partnership with the Gulf” which was launched in May 2022.²

The trend towards more engagement in technical cooperation could intensify. Since less financial resources are available for the realization of costly infrastructure projects and more funds are needed domestically, development policy actors from the Gulf monarchies could become more involved in education projects and training to promote female and youth and female empowerment. As a consequence, German and Gulf approaches in technical cooperation could be better aligned with each other.

Furthermore, a generational change of decision-making in the Gulf monarchies offers a new chance for dialogue. In respective developmental organizations, a young and often female generation of advisors and experts has the interest to promote more multilateralism and project coordination with partners such as Germany. Nonetheless, such a trend is more obvious in philanthropic institutions whereas in governmental donor organizations such as the development funds still traditional elites play a powerful role.

Migration management offers an opportunity for closer cooperation. Today, one in ten of all migrants worldwide is employed in the Gulf States, making the migration corridor between the sending regions in Asia and Africa to the Gulf region one of the most important in the world. Almost 25% of all global remittances in 2020 are transferred from members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to home countries of migrants. The majority of them work mainly in the low-wage sector in construction or services, and as domestic workers in the private sector. In times of COVID-19, the

situation of labor migrants working in different Arab Gulf destination countries has become even more vulnerable than before. Repatriations and detentions of low- and semi-skilled labor have increased. This treatment of migrants has been criticized by international actors such as the European Parliament, human rights organizations as well as from some governments of countries of origin and civil society actors. This controversial debate about the structural mistreatment of labor migrants in the Gulf monarchies has tremendously intensified prior to the FIFA World Cup in Qatar. In the case of Qatar, about 2.8 million people live there, of whom 2.5 million do not have Qatari nationality. Thus, the proportion of migrants is 88.4% of the total population, of which only 17.2% are women who work mainly in the domestic sphere. In 1950, Qatar had a population of just 50,000, but in 2010 – the year the World Cup was awarded – it was 1.7 million and rose to 2.1 million by 2013. Between 1996 and 2019, the population grew by 18%.³ Since Qatar won the bid for the World Cup in 2010, the need for workers in the construction sector increased significantly, so that in the meantime up to 1 million migrant workers worked on the World Cup construction sites and other World Cup-related infrastructure. For decades, South Asian labor migration to Saudi Arabia is characterized by structural violence, systemic exploitation and constant insecurities in the sending country before, during and after the recruitment process which is driven by criminal recruitment agencies, governments of sending countries that heavily rely on remittances, the abusive job market conditions in Gulf monarchies and the exploitation based on asymmetric power structures within the sponsorship system (kafala).

Against this backdrop, the need to foster safe and regular migration, improve the conditions for returning migrants and initiate cohesive activities for future migrants' orientation has intensified. As the Gulf monarchies are relevant receiving countries of labor migrants from Africa and Asia, they consider migration policies as a relevant priority. The controversial debate about the structural violence against labor migrants in Qatar prior to the World Cup 2022 has further shown that Gulf leaderships need to take into consideration to improve legal and political regulations in order to improve working conditions. Against this backdrop, governments in Qatar and beyond showed interest to join forces with Germany to introduce mutual projects in relevant sending countries of migrants and to establish migrants' orientation centers on a co-financing level. Focus countries are in the Horn of Africa such as Eritrea and Ethiopia, neighboring Arab countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories and South Asia such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Nepal. Joint measures of safe migration could thus become a concrete field of closer cooperation. Orientation courses, training and capacity development to prepare future migrants for upcoming challenges are interesting instruments to enhance German-Gulf cooperation. Furthermore, returning migrants and their families also need better support in order to find chances to reintegrate into national job markets and cope mentally with traumatic migration experiences. In recent years, several organizations such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and other UN organizations have established networks and projects related to this topic. In addition, high-ranking political dialogue formats such as the Abu Dhabi Dialogue are discussing labor migration issues.⁴ However, comprehensive exchange platforms including different stakeholders are still lacking significantly. Especially NGOs, charities or initiatives run by local individuals or organized from parts of the diasporas are often not included into high-ranking exchange formats. Therefore, the knowledge and

networks to foster mutual activities in safe migration and to provide background information on a practitioner's level is still limited but offers great potential for enhanced cooperation between Germany and relevant institutions located in the Gulf monarchies.


GCC: Total population and percentage of nationals and non-nationals in GCC countries

	Total population	Nationals	Foreign Nationals	% nationals	% non-nationals
Bahrain	1,501,635	712,362	789,273	47.4	52.6
Kuwait	4,670,713	1,459,970	3,210,743	31.3	68.7
Oman	4,471,148	2,731,456	1,739,692	61.1	38.9
Qatar	2,846,118	328,985	2,517,133	11.6	88.4
Saudi Arabia	35,013,414	21,430,128	13,583,286	61.2	38.8
UAE	9,503,738	1,244,638	8,259,100	13.1	86.9
Total	58,006,766	27,907,539	30,099,227	48.1	51.9

National statistics, 2020

Table 5 – Source: GLMM. (last checked: 04.01.2023)


Remittances from Gulf Cooperation Council member states



In million USD; * Bahrain: 2019 and 2020 n/a

Figure 2 – Source: KNOMAD. (last checked: 04.01.2023)


Remittances to relevant sending countries



In million USD

Figure 3 – Source: KNOMAD. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

GDP share of remittances in selected countries in 2021



GDP share (in %)

Figure 4 – Source: KNOMAD. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

Cooperation could be promoted in the fields of education and vocational training.

In particular, some philanthropic organizations in the Gulf monarchies, such as EAA or Silatech in Qatar, the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences (KFAS) or the Emirati Al Ghurair Foundation initiate and finance education and training projects in the MENA region. There exist interesting overlaps with German measures in the educational sector, vocational training or the empowerment of youth and females. Such players pursue an approach that often appears to be compatible with the premises of German development cooperation, albeit with different financing modalities and oftentimes too ambitious objectives regarding the number of recipients which complicates concrete project implementation. Hence, both sides should engage in a more comprehensive dialogue in order to find flexible ways to enhance cooperation. Definitely, there is potential for closer cooperation in the area of e-learning, knowledge transfer or the provision of scholarships for disadvantaged groups. Both sides show an interest in improving access to education and training measures in certain partner countries in order to create social resilience, socio-economic participation and better opportunities for integration into the labor market.

Interesting opportunities to cooperate in energy diversification and climate action exist.

As outlined above, Gulf monarchies are discussing climate action, energy diversification and environmental issues much more intensively than ever before. Specific institutions such as KFAS or the IsDB are more engaged in those sectors and are promoting project implementation in partner countries. Therefore, Germany could enter closer partnerships with Gulf monarchies in those areas. As energy partnerships with Saudi Arabia⁵, the UAE⁶ and Qatar⁷ already exist, such agreements could also serve as future drivers of joint projects in green capacity development, training and awareness raising campaigns

- 1 Sebastian Sons, Menschenrechte sind nicht käuflich. Wie die WM in Katar auch bei uns zu einer neuen Politik führen muss, Hamburg: Atrium 2022.
- 2 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: A strategic partnership with the Gulf, May 18, 2022, <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Joint%20Communication%20to%20the%20European%20Parliament%20and%20the%20Council%20-%20A%20Strategic%20Partnership%20with%20the%20Gulf.pdf>.
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- 7 German Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, Qatar and Germany sign Partnership, May 20, 2022, <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2022/05/20220520-qatar-and-germany-sign-energy-partnership.html>.

VIII. Challenges for enhanced cooperation

In Germany and the Gulf monarchies, mutual expectations were often too unrealistic. From a German perspective, it was expected that Gulf donors would be able to cover extensive co-financing and financial resources for projects in technical cooperation. However, this priority was not met to a large extent because the bilateral Gulf partners that are eligible for technical cooperation usually only have limited funds. Furthermore, multilateral organizations have to rely only on special or limited funding lines for grants. Since the financing modalities and procedures of Gulf partner institutions do not always fit with German requirements of ODA and are thus not always compatible, the necessary adjustments were felt to be too costly in some cases. Furthermore, Gulf stakeholders hoped for enhanced access to political decision-makers and a willingness to engage in dialogue on an equal footing, which was only partially realized due to the lack of political prioritization in recent years on a German side.

Inadequate donor coordination at the political and technical level has made cooperation more difficult or, in some cases, impossible. Neither German development cooperation nor Arab partners have sufficiently exhausted the existing forums for donor coordination, e.g. via the OECD-DAC. The institutional fragmentation of German development cooperation and lacking coordination between responsible ministries such as the Federal Foreign Office and the BMZ oftentimes confused potential Arab partners and resulted in less comprehensive coordination and bureaucratic challenges. Furthermore, a regular exchange with the ACG does not take place. So far, strategic conceptualization and alignment of German and Gulf monarchies' development cooperation does not exist which makes joint project planning and implementation more complicated. Driven by their hierarchical decision-making structures, Gulf stakeholders are mainly interested in high-ranking political dialogue formats which undermines technical exchange.

In some German government departments, concerns about potential reputational risks made it complicated to realize concrete cooperation with Gulf organizations. Sometimes, contradictory assessments of the potential to work with Gulf donors have emerged which resulted in lacking political commitment to proceed with concrete project implementation. In general, risks for cooperation were evaluated as relatively high although due diligence and risks assessments did not always come to the same critical conclusions. Therefore, the political dimension of cooperation with Arab partners should not be underestimated as the critical debate about the Gulf monarchies regarding human rights, military interventionism and potential terror financing feature prominently in the German developmental discourse and overshadows the technical potentials for project-related cooperation. Such position has also created mistrust on the Gulf side, as respective stakeholders are interested to establish a cooperation model based on trust and credibility. In particular, the dilemma to interlink value-oriented foreign policymaking with interests of realpolitik often cause a problem for German decisionmakers to enter into closer cooperation with partners such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE or Qatar. In addition, lacking personal and technical capacities on both sides also undermine potential cooperation. Finally, German development cooperation oftentimes does not need additional funding in terms of co-financing

or parallel financing as it already has significant financial resources available. As a consequence, interest in cooperation with Arab partners has been minimal as no external funding was needed and administrative efforts were considered as too high and time-consuming.

In contrast to other international institutions such as the European Union through its delegation offices in several GCC states or USAID and the UK, Germany did not manage to establish a physical presence in the GCC states with a special focus on development cooperation. The embassies and consulates do not have specific experts on humanitarianism and developmentalism as the GCC states are not considered countries of development. This situation was oftentimes criticized by Gulf interlocutors and sometimes tarnished project implementation and the day-to-day and people-to-people exchange.

Mapping developmental organizations from the Arab Gulf states

Saudi Arabia in brief: Country profile and statistics

- › Between 1975 and 2005, total Saudi aid amounted to USD 90 billion or 3.7% of its annual gross domestic product (GDP) which was delivered to more than 80 countries. Historically, major recipients of Saudi aid include Egypt, Syria, Sudan, the Palestinian Territories, Yemen, Bangladesh, Turkey and Pakistan.
 - › In total, Saudi Arabia has disbursed more than 60% of all Arab ODA over the past four decades. However, the volume of its ODA remains volatile as it depends on high oil prices and revenues from fossil energy.
 - › In contrast to the UAE or Qatar, Saudi aid is heavily affected in times of economic crisis as the government needs to reduce its foreign humanitarian assistance in favor of domestic spending. Budget constraints due to the negative implications of COVID-19 or financial liabilities resulting from the current military engagement in Yemen also have implications on Saudi Arabia's humanitarian engagement. However, recipients of utmost strategic relevance such as Yemen receive constant aid even in times of financial constraints.
 - › Driven by its vast oil revenues, the kingdom established itself as one of the most prominent humanitarian donors and instrumentalizes aid policies to fulfill the Islamic obligation to help the poor and needy but also to extend political and economic links with developing countries and emerging markets as part of the socioeconomic transformation the country is undergoing.
 - › Most of Saudi Arabia's aid has been channeled in the form of humanitarian assistance in terms of grants, loans, budget support, energy subsidies and economic investments.
 - › In an effort to stabilize Arab monarchies during the "Arab Uprisings" of 2010/11, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies provided a total of 7 billion USD to Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, and Morocco. It was reported that Saudi Arabia pledged in total 12 billion USD to the Egyptian government under President Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi in the form of central bank deposits, energy subsidies and budget support.
 - › Sectoral foci are infrastructure projects, especially in the fields of energy and transport. Between 2007 and 2018, Saudi Arabia provided more than USD 12.3 billion to 909 projects in humanitarian aid and emergency relief followed by the transportation sector (USD 4.7 billion), banking and financial services (USD 3 billion) and agriculture (USD 2.2 billion).
 - › In 2018, Saudi Arabia became a participant in the OECD-DAC, underlining the commitment of the Saudi leadership to closely cooperate with the international donor community. As part of those multi-lateral efforts, the Saudi Aid Platform was launched which presents a coherent data set and information on Saudi Arabia's development assistance for the first time in Saudi history.
 - › As the "Custodian of the Holy Mosques" of Mecca and Medina, the provision of financial assistance in support for religious purposes is a cornerstone of Saudi Arabia's aid policy. However, in recent decades, the kingdom has been accused of financing extremist and even jihadist groups in other countries. As a consequence, the Saudi government has implemented a variety of legal regulations and control mechanisms to better monitor foreign funding and also closed some Islamic charities.
 - › Since the establishment of KSrelief in 2015, Saudi Arabia's humanitarian decision-making was centralized and is closely aligned with the decision-making circle of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman.
 - › Despite institutional centralization, Saudi Arabia's donor landscape is composed of government donors such as SFD and KSrelief but also of private and semi-governmental organizations such as charities, religious entities and welfare organizations, and private individuals such as wealthy businessmen, members of the clergy and high-ranking members of the royal family. This complexity results in a lack of comprehensive data. However, by participating in the OECD-DAC, the Saudi government has shown its political will to improve the transparency of donor activities.
 - › In addition, only little insights exist into decision-making in Saudi Arabia, as the circle of decision-makers consists of few people who surround the Crown Prince.
- Potential chances for closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia**
- › Although Germany and Saudi Arabia differ with regard to their strategic outlooks for the democra-

tic transition in countries such as Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan or Iraq, they share a common interest in the overarching importance of regional economic and social stability.

- › Saudi development organizations enjoy networks to stakeholders in countries of joint interest.
- › While Saudi aid still focuses mainly on financial assistance, Germany could aim to provide more expertise to enhance technical cooperation.
- › Closer cooperation with Saudi development organizations could enhance political dialogue with the Saudi government on humanitarianism, providing an entry point to engage with Saudi Arabia on a political level.
- › In recent years, Saudi Arabia has shied away from its interventionist foreign policy and aims to follow a more pragmatic and balanced approach which could improve the chances for closer bilateral cooperation.
- › Saudi development organizations such as KSrelief also aim to engage more in health and energy which are interesting sectors for closer coordination.
- › In light of a closer energy dialogue, Germany could express its interest to engage in a more comprehensive partnership including joint project implementation in development cooperation.
- › The more Saudi Arabia is centralizing its aid policies, the greater the chances to form coherent and sustainable partnership models. KSrelief has been promoted as a center of excellence for humanitarianism and partners with several international organizations.

Potential challenges for closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia

- › In general, political reservations to cooperate with Saudi Arabia remain high. Topics such as the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, a negative human rights record or the military engagement in Yemen will remain highly problematic and could create reputational risks in the case of closer development cooperation.
- › Biased and party-affiliated development assistance has hampered Saudi reputation in several beneficiary countries as assistance tended to be provided to parties and clients loyal to Saudi Arabia. The political conditionality of Saudi assistance and its consequent intervention in political affairs of other countries is

viewed critically among sizeable parts of the elite and the general public in many Arab states, e.g. in Tunisia, Lebanon, and Yemen. Such a politicization of aid will remain a challenge for any form of bilateral cooperation with Germany.

- › Saudi Arabia is strongly interested in increasing its domestic food security by providing incentives to Saudi investors to find investment opportunities abroad. It has thus been criticized for its involvement in “land-grabbing”, although most of its activities have been based on private-sector contracts.
- › Still, the provision of development assistance is mostly driven by top-down and high-ranking political decisions which can result in short-term ad hoc decisions and unpredictability.
- › Many Saudi development agencies still lack efficient administrative structures. Furthermore, procedures and approaches that differ from those of DAC donor countries make cooperation and coordination difficult.
- › There is a lack of technical staff, which hampers dialogue and coordination on all levels.
- › In general, the modalities of providing assistance differ widely and thus do not lend themselves easily to cooperation and coordination with the German Development Assistance, especially not in recipient countries themselves.

Volume of bilateral aid from Saudi Arabia (2011–2022)

	ODA Contribution	2017	506,394,567
2011	219,200,000	2018	1,678,213,863
2012	512,925,108	2019	1,468,594,128
2013	209,524,363	2020	907,875,996
2014	877,895,210	2021	1,360,211,798
2015	582,732,091	2022	254,803,306
2016	422,873,495	Total	9,001,243,925

In USD; per year

Table 6 – Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service.
(last checked: 04.01.2023)

Target countries and regions of ODA for Saudi Arabia (from 2011–2022)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Afghanistan	5,903,003									10,723,547		11,000,000
All other funding	1,736,708	11,423,852	6,406,938	26,601,663	14,462,827	20,740,361	12,337,857	17,989,700	26,267,275	38,506,992	51,769,545	8,242,890
Bangladesh							14,505,519		10,959,365		14,964,259	
Djibouti					8,463,247		2,587,745	2,536,525	12,036,992			
Ethiopia	1,000,000	1,835,379		42,000,000								
Global								18,663,154	51,080,561	279,719,607	156,942,664	
Guinea				12,400,000								
Indonesia	850,000											
Iraq				500,000,000								
Jordan		65,866,944	31,223,763	35,725,034	27,226,988	7,875,283	13,571,621	5,243,417	8,430,645	7,504,058	18,441,682	5,058,026
Kazakhstan						3,400,000						
Kenya	1,744,137			10,000,000								
Lebanon	10,000,000	26,170,266	21,203,507		31,636,828	3,853,753	3,652,936	3,500,000	23,185,015	9,268,397	5,771,085	8,026,503
Malaysia											4,848,926	
Mali			4,960,730		10,000,000							
Mauritania						3,280,257						
Mauritius									10,282,133			
Niger	2,269,479							10,000,000		5,445,683		1,585,492
Not specified		20,062,500	80,600,000	61,160,393		19,213,526	26,072,875	106,368,490	18,644,928	42,990,949		
Palestinian territory	84,637,039	23,500,000	6,705,933	83,540,000	42,212,600	12,342,850				8,528,424		
Pakistan	17,500,793	2,621,550	7,324,946	36,643,077	11,622,535		2,513,406				21,948,844	5,821,965
Philippines			10,341,752									1,500,000
Poland												10,000,000
Somalia	95,187,461	93,363,450	4,458,020		13,270,821	19,558,165	16,225,561	12,169,333	13,302,788	10,305,466	8,066,884	7,221,690
Sudan			10,000,000					66,026,089		7,267,798	5,649,418	1,742,164
Syrian Arab Republic		225,892,028	21,773,184	30,429,839	27,145,204	26,053,491	50,363,409	34,773,727	6,000,000			
Tajikistan						12,041,601	53,206,263					
Tunisia											7,050,366	
Turkey		39,993,833		31,359,823	14,062,708							
Yemen	1,249,979	2,195,306			372,549,165	276,005,448	300,184,193	1,398,710,356	1,288,404,426	487,615,075	1,064,758,125	194,604,576

In USD; per country

Table 7 – Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

Pledges and disbursements to international and multilateral organizations from Saudi Arabia (from 2011–2022)

Recipient organization	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
All other funding	6,873,459	354,112,585	138,087,589	314,891,258	223,657,960	102,939,777	207,823,186	513,697,732	744,637,257	337,303,557	264,123,341	114,898,717
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations										140,000,000		
Custodian of Two Holy Mosques Relief Campaign			38,022,635			22,815,572						
Dynasafe International Group												33,292,000
Famine Relief Fund											230,000,000	
GAVI Alliance											100,000,000	
International Organization for Migration				49,064,400								34,400,000
Islamic Development Bank								81,963,154				
King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center	46,306,773	89,258,295	9,382,857			31,338,250	35,079,042		52,996,904		46,248,180	
Organization of Islamic Cooperation		6,500,000										
Palestine Red Crescent Society				53,333,333								
The Saudi Development and Reconstruction Program for Yemen								226,390,101	67,863,206	47,752,472	590,983,025	
United Nations Children's Fund				97,647,900	35,135,177		34,050,000	81,281,779	56,000,000	51,629,732		22,155,111
United Nations Development Programme	5,397,000											
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees		26,814,868		91,495,921	38,852,202	18,426,790						
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	89,783,911	29,216,587			44,111,881							
World Food Programme	63,717,456	7,022,773	4,031,282	271,462,398	148,580,127	30,495,885		251,838,005	388,694,159	151,463,406	128,857,252	
World Health Organization	10,000,000						45,118,290			179,726,829		27,915,788
Yemeni Development Network for NGOs												22,141,690

In USD; per institution

Table 8 – Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

UAE in brief: Country profile and statistics

- › The UAE has been an active donor since the 1970s and is thus not a new or emerging donor. In recent years, the UAE aid sector has been modernized and professionalized, which is also driven by the UAE ambition to align its development assistance with OECD-DAC standards. The UAE was the first non-OECD country to participate in the OECD-DAC in July 2014.
- › In 2013 the UAE had established a standalone Ministry of International Cooperation and Development (MICAD) which was merged with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015 forming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MOFAIC).
- › Interestingly, the UAE differentiates between “foreign assistance” and “ODA according to OECD-DAC standards”. Only official flows of aid to ODA-eligible countries, including loan repayments are reported as “ODA”. “Foreign assistance” includes all official and private flows of aid money to all countries including Islamic assistance.
- › Similar to the other Gulf monarchies, the UAE provides most of its financial assistance on a bilateral level. Humanitarian aid and emergency relief feature very prominently in the UAE’s traditional aid policy but technical cooperation in fields such as education, vocational training, and youth and female empowerment, mobility and infrastructure, energy and sustainability, government effectiveness and services have gained more attention in recent years.
- › As part of this endeavor, the UAE Policy for Foreign Assistance 2017-2021 “Promoting Global Peace and Prosperity” was launched in 2016 in order to streamline the UAE’s development cooperation aiming at improving efficiency and professionalization.
- › Egypt has been the main recipient of UAE foreign aid, receiving 16% of all UAE assistance between 1971 and 2004 and in particular after the “Arab Uprisings”: As the top recipient between 2013 and 2016, the officially reported volume of UAE foreign aid to Egypt during these three years amounted to USD 16.6 billion. In addition, the Arab monarchies Jordan and Morocco were main beneficiaries of UAE aid during this time period as well as Yemen.
- › Up until 2017, most of UAE aid was disbursed to North Africa. Since then, though, the focus has shifted towards Eastern African countries. UAE foreign aid to this region increased between 2017 and 2018 from 10% to 74% – a trend that is continuing in recent years for geostrategic and logistical reasons. Main recipients are Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia.

Potential chances for closer cooperation with the UAE

- › Germany and the UAE have developed a more comprehensive and personal partnership in recent years which was indicated by regular visits of Sultan al-Jaber, at that time top advisor to the UAE leadership regarding development cooperation to Berlin.
- › With regard to the German public, the UAE is perceived as more progressive than other Gulf monarchies. However, media coverage on the UAE is still limited. As other Gulf monarchies have been more in the public spotlight such as Qatar due to the World Cup in 2022, nuanced public debate about the UAE did not take place on a comprehensive level.
- › Furthermore, the UAE and Germany entered a strategic partnership in 2004 and signed a joint declaration of intent in June 2019 in which also closer cooperation in humanitarian efforts was outlined.
- › The UAE enjoys close political and economic relations with a number of emerging markets and development partners in the Global South, especially in Africa. As Germany’s development policy focuses on activities in Africa, the UAE provides an interesting counterpart in terms of co-financing, implementation and networks.
- › The UAE has significantly diversified its economy which has resulted in a more professional institutionalized development cooperation driven by the MOFAIC. Thus, the UAE offers well-equipped networks and interlocutors to work with. In addition, cooperation with the UAE is considered less controversial by German policymakers compared to cooperation with other Gulf monarchies as the UAE’s regional agenda is less contested than that of Saudi Arabia.

- › UAE entities have expressed their interest to enter into closer cooperation with Germany in the field of capacity development. Germany and its development organisations are perceived as experienced players in this field, and regular exchanges have taken place in recent years. Joint trainings in sectors such as procedures and techniques, impact monitoring, conflict sensitive approaches, transition from humanitarian to development assistance, involvement of the private sector, and technical issues could be of mutual interest.
- › Since becoming a member of the OECD-DAC, the UAE has improved its transparency in providing data and promote multilateral cooperation. As the UAE aligns its humanitarian efforts with the SDGs, it has also engaged in several working groups of the OECD-DAC together with international donors.
- › Germany and the UAE share an interest in supporting SMEs and in utilizing Public Private Partnerships (PPP) as instruments to create employment and to tackle the challenge of youth unemployment and female empowerment across the region. In addition, sectors such as health, education, renewable energy, energy efficiency, desertification and urban development are considered relevant drivers for development.
- › The majority of development assistance by the UAE is loan-based and does therefore not easily blend with German technical assistance. The benefit of the cooperation should therefore be measured mainly in terms of trust-building and increased insights into the modalities and processes of UAE entities and donor organisations.

Volume of bilateral aid from the UAE (2011–2022)

	Total funding	2017	293,888,225
2011	193,336,361	2018	2,168,420,588
2012	42,249,200	2019	611,990,800
2013	305,041,024	2020	394,269,639
2014	147,663,969	2021	390,164,366
2015	721,837,156	2022	334,506,426
2016	715,431,488	Total	6,318,799,242

In USD; per year

Table 9 – Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service.
(last checked: 04.01.2023)

Potential challenges for closer cooperation with the UAE

- › As the UAE is interested to consolidate its logistical and infrastructural network across the region and beyond, aid is oftentimes politicized for economic and political motivations.
- › The human rights record remains contested. Political repression and surveillance measures have intensified in recent years which undermines the international reputation of the UAE. Hence, German policymakers need to take those critical issues into consideration in every sector of potential cooperation as they need to expect public opposition against such partnerships. In such contexts, it is difficult to illicit understanding for the positive long-term benefits and spill-over effects from cooperation with such countries.
- › The UAE's hedging position in times of the Russian war against Ukraine has also hampered its political image. So far, the UAE is promoting a narrative in which non-alignment in global conflict features prominently.

UAE foreign aid versus ODA (from 2009–2019)

	Net ODA	Foreign aid	ODA quota	DAC donor ranking
2019	2.2 (preliminary)	(no information yet)	0.55% (preliminary)	(no information yet)
2018	3.9	7.79	0.95%	4
2017	3.99	5.1	1.03%	1
2016	4.17	6.06	1.21%	1
2015	4.38	8.8	1.18%	2
2014	4.58	6.16	1.26%	1
2013	5.42	5.89	1.34%	1
2012	1.07	1.59	0.27%	19
2011	0.74	2.11	0.22%	20
2010	0.58	0.76	0.17%	26
2009	1.05	1.28	0.36%	14

In billion USD; per country

Table 10 – Sources: Annual Reports 2011–2018 “UAE Foreign Aid”, MOFAIC: Abu Dhabi; OECD (2020), “United Arab Emirates”, in Development Co-operation Profiles, OECD Publishing: Paris; OECD Development Reports 2017–2019, OECD Publishing Paris. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

Philippines			10,853,308	10,000,000						
Serbia									18,442,560	
Somalia	19,768,605	7,205,788				4,670,639				12,794,422
Sri Lanka					260,170					
Sudan									34,847,676	5,062,574
Syrian Arab Republic			198,085,918	50,136,254	5,650,043	73,741,064	10,000,000	9,618,469	10,000,000	2,000,000
Tunisia	9,756,112									6,132,000
Turkey	2,435,791									
Uganda								4,100,000	5,000,000	
Ukraine										6,551,920
Yemen	50,666,320	13,746,079	1,361,285		627,064,939	474,953,221	202,841,112	2,083,229,673	488,975,412	231,633,542
Zimbabwe								2,000,000	2,000,000	23,291,325

In USD; per country

Table 11 – Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

Pledges and disbursements to international and multilateral organizations from UAE (from 2011–2022)

Recipient organization	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
All other funding	109,898,776		59,565,224	17,765,475	53,914,289	240,237,550	37,693,053	181,942,386	62,717,481	259,674,903	71,823,180	55,241,668
Central Emergency Response Fund		50,000										
Famine Relief Fund											230,000,000	
International Rescue Committee					1,500,000							
Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation					36,175,916							43,108,871
National NGOs (Confidential)										20,701,537		
Not specified		20,734,649										
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs		269,975										
Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates	10,365,667	20,924,669	19,122,616	57,823,133	601,959,284	361,379,934	218,195,172	1,311,995,432	69,321,695	39,412,068	36,054,975	38,203,420
United Nations Children's Fund				12,000,000				77,575,992	110,116,412			
United Nations Development Programme						50,000,000			50,800,000			
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees				5,000,000	2,247,389				271,035,212			
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees								38,225,697				
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	9,939,589		13,005,000	24,075,361		15,000,000	16,000,000		50,800,000			
World Food Programme	13,132,329	269,907	21,872,000	31,000,000				504,516,454	271,035,212		23,457,708	66,358,775
World Health Organization						12,000,000		5,164,627	48,000,000			

In USD; per institution Table 12 – Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

Kuwait in brief: Country profile and statistics

- › From all the Gulf countries, Kuwait has the longest history in development and humanitarian engagement: The Kuwait Fund for Development, today the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, was established in 1962 positioning Kuwait as a champion of South-South cooperation.
 - › Since then, Kuwait's ODA quota has averaged 1.5% of its GDP and more than USD 44 billion has been channeled to partner countries.
 - › Similar to other Gulf countries, data transparency regarding its ODA remains a challenge despite the fact that Kuwait became member of the OECD-DAC in January 2018. Nonetheless, multilateral donor coordination feature prominently in Kuwait's development assistance. For instance, the multilateral organization AGFUND is based in Kuwait and dialogue with the ACG also plays a relevant role in Kuwait's aid portfolio.
 - › Kuwait has provided significant core-funding to UN organizations. Between 2010 and 2016, Kuwait disbursed almost USD 800 million to several UN organisations with the largest share of USD 338 million going to the UNHCR, followed by UNICEF with USD 137 million and the World Food Program with USD 124 million.
 - › Driven by the political interest to remain a neutral regional player, Kuwait considers development cooperation as a soft power instrument which aims to improve the country's image as an "honest broker", facilitator, mediator, moderator and a platform for humanitarianism. Motivated by the trauma of Iraq's invasion in 1990, Kuwait has a greater interest than its neighbors to preserve friendly and pragmatic relations with regional players. Against this backdrop, Kuwait was designated by the UN as "International Humanitarian Center" in 2014.
 - › Kuwait's main sectors of focus are transport, energy, agriculture, and water but there is also a growing shift to more projects related to education and youth empowerment.
 - › More than 50% of all Kuwaiti aid has been directed to Arab countries such as Yemen, Egypt or Jordan. Kuwait has placed a special focus on support for Syrian refugees: Kuwait hosted three UN donor conferences for Syrian refugee relief and pledged more than USD 1.6 billion in humanitarian assistance by 2018. This support has been mainly channeled through UN organizations but also through Islamic charities and philanthropic organizations.
- ### Potential chances for closer cooperation with Kuwait
- › In general, Kuwait will continue to show serious commitment to fostering social and human development. In recent years, all relevant political, societal and economic stakeholders from governmental and non-governmental entities have expressed the dire need to overcome the long-term dependence on oil revenues. Against this backdrop, the continuous development in areas such as social and human development, youth and women's empowerment, education and research, good governance, multilateralism and public diplomacy will remain key for Kuwaiti political decision-makers.
 - › Kuwait's main official document for national development is the Vision 2035 "New Kuwait" which was introduced in January 30, 2017. It is aimed to improve humanitarian assistance contributions, foster peace, justice and strong institutions, fight corruption, enhance educational and social skills and tackle the gender gap. It also seeks to implement the SDGs in all relevant activities by establishing the National Sustainable Development Committee (NSDC). Thus, it offers the political framework to promote humanitarian cooperation with international partners.
 - › In contrast to other Gulf monarchies, Kuwait enjoys a positive image as a reliable and predictable humanitarian actor. Despite rising domestic political tensions and economic challenges, Kuwait has continued its humanitarian engagement in recent years and cooperates closely with international organizations.
 - › In recent years, actors of the German development cooperation have established close and personal ties with the technical level of KFAED.
 - › Kuwait's foreign policy is pragmatic and non-ideological and is driven by Kuwait's commitment to promote regional and national stability. Against this

backdrop, Kuwait enjoys a good standing among partners, recipient states and other Gulf monarchies. Driven by its long experience in development cooperation, professional structures and efficient networks are existing which have consolidated Kuwait's reputation.

- › Unlike other Gulf monarchies, reputational risks are comparatively low as Kuwait enjoys a better human rights record. Furthermore, the vibrant civil society and the influential role of the Kuwaiti parliament can be considered as further assets for dialogue in humanitarianism.
- › Germany and Kuwait share mutual interests in terms of security and stability, regional dialogue, or promotion of civil society actors. Furthermore, both states are interested to stabilize the situation in Iraq as Kuwait considers any destabilization of its neighbor as a direct threat to national interests. Against this backdrop, mutual engagement in civil peace service and conflict mediation in Iraq could be of interest for both Germany and Kuwait.

Potential challenges for closer cooperation with Kuwait

- › Kuwait faces tremendous financial and economic obstacles. Against the backdrop of the so-called "double shock" caused by a decline in oil prices and the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, Kuwait suffers from rising economic challenges that have negative repercussions on the realization of specific development goals. As a result, fewer financial resources for humanitarian assistance were available or have been channeled domestically.
- › Redistributive modes of governance are therefore impacting social transformation on all levels. Still, oil rents continue to account for almost 90% of governmental revenues and amount to nearly 50% of the GDP. Thus, the diversification of the economy will remain crucial which could divert attention away from further developments in fields of social and human development.
- › Traditionally, the National Assembly plays an important role in Kuwait's politics. While the Emir appoints the cabinet and has the power to dissolve the parliament, the parliament serves as a key player in articulating political grievances. As part of the power struggle in this halfway democracy, nine parliaments were dissolved by the Emir between 1975 and 2016. Therefore, Kuwait's political

decision-making oftentimes suffers from stand-still and tensions between the government and the parliament which also impacts Kuwait's development cooperation.

- › In September 2020, Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah passed away and was succeeded by the former Crown Prince Nawaf al-Ahmed al-Sabah, who is the half-brother of the late Emir. The new Emir proclaimed to continue Sabah's balanced foreign policy approach and focus on domestic socio-economic transformation. However, uncertainties remain resulting from the transformative succession process after Emir Sabah died and the tense relationship between the government and the National Assembly.
- › Corruption, inefficient administration and the lack of female representation in political decision-making constitute challenges that are widely discussed within the Kuwaiti society and civil society.

Volume of bilateral aid from Kuwait (2011–2022)

	Total funding	2017	204,561,077
2011	13,615,000	2018	373,542,378
2012	11,521,859	2019	175,434,226
2013	323,769,152	2020	137,311,632
2014	350,908,449	2021	2,623,407
2015	463,550,143	2022	16,687,000
2016	347,950,986	Total	2,421,475,309

In USD; per year

Table 13 – Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service.
(last checked: 04.01.2023)

Target countries and regions of ODA for Kuwait (from 2011–2022)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Afghanistan												4,000,000
All other funding		204,044					3,589,449	949,000	2,666,208	11,728,058		
Bangladesh								1,700,000	569,674	3,493,554		
Comoros		195,409										
Congo									983,607			
Djibouti										1,225,534		
Egypt			5,456,960	10,088,500	16,000,000	35,000,000	15,000,000					
Global										23,145,318		
Honduras											89,991	
Indonesia		245,317			2,770,652							
Iran, Islamic Republic of									1,355,105	9,063,946		
Iraq			11,233,434	25,907,050	33,425,668	54,891,505	33,602,450	21,744,190	7,026,430	11,727,879		
Jordan		682,646	80,642,349	69,457,330	57,911,864	40,000,000	21,123,050	729,166	3,346,060	5,004,638		1,917,000
Lebanon		5,230,496	86,070,633	38,800,000	81,149,149	62,960,000	27,351,450	2,162,877	5,500,385	12,131,895		
Malawi												20,000
Mauritania												20,000
Mozambique												53,411
Myanmar						50,000						
Nigeria								625,000				
Not specified	1,675,000	2,000,000	43,013,714	108,723,860	130,911,296	62,107,444	13,320,298	50,410,000	4,162,870	46,766,699		1,000,000
Palestinian territory		152,025		14,157,409						10,950,055		
Philippines		984,065	150,000	125,000								
Somalia	11,940,000	456,715		575,000	2,694,023		2,525,000	1,800,000				
South Sudan							2,525,000				200,000	
Sudan												120,000
Syrian Arab Republic		1,250,000	75,217,738	73,226,550	113,832,511	31,960,000	29,909,500	30,984,000	31,332,302	2,074,056		2,770,000
Turkey			20,797,838	9,847,750	11,040,000	20,250,000	30,642,000	729,166	552,000			
Uganda											120,005	
Ukraine												1,000,000
Yemen		121,142			13,814,980	40,732,037	18,825,000	260,748,974	115,359,879		2,000,000	4,000,000

In USD; per country

Table 14 – Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

Pledges and disbursements to international and multilateral organizations from Kuwait (from 2011–2022)

Recipient organization	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
All other funding	1,440,000	6,013,142	54,644,152	133,883,449	191,997,243	153,298,949	82,883,449	85,538,113	55,827,875	30,377,394	93,411	1,750,000
Central Emergency Response Fund	675,000	1,000,000										5,020,000
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations										10,000,000		2,917,000
GAVI Alliance										10,000,000		2,000,000
Honduran Red Cross											89,991	
International Committee of the Red Cross			25,000,000	20,000,000					14,000,000			
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies		1,000,000										
Kuwait Red Crescent Society	10,000,000	2,003,717			30,662,900						120,000	
Kuwaiti Yemeni Relief						40,732,037						
Lebanese Red Cross										6,434,238		
The United Iraqi Medical Society for Relief and Development							17,209,450					
Uganda Red Cross Society											120,005	
United Nations Children's Fund	250,000		55,000,000	36,650,000	45,000,000			78,750,265	26,978,869			5,020,000
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	1,000,000	1,250,000	112,000,000	103,125,000	120,890,000			43,170,000	18,181,000		2,000,000	2,917,000
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East								47,100,000				2,000,000
World Food Programme	250,000	255,000	42,000,000	37,250,000	45,000,000		29,468,178	55,600,000	32,248,302		200,000	3,000,000
World Health Organization			35,125,000					63,384,000	27,498,180	75,500,000		
Yemen Humanitarian Fund												2,000,000

In USD; per institution

Table 15 – Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

Qatar in brief: Country profile and statistics

- › In contrast to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, Qatar has just recently started to engage more strategically in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. During the reign of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (r. 1995-2013), development cooperation was established as a pillar of Qatar's soft power.
- › Launched in October 2008, the "Qatar National Vision 2030" (QNV 2030) was the first development vision strategy among all Gulf states. It introduced a holistic approach to national development. QNV 2030 also mentions human development as a fundamental pillar of Qatar policymaking.
- › Despite the ramifications of the blockade and the outbreak of COVID-19, Qatar was comparatively less impacted by financial and economic constraints. This can be attributed to the fact that Qatar's revenues are mainly generated from Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), the decline in oil prices did not tremendously challenge the state budget. Thus, development cooperation was not directly impacted by the implications of COVID-19.
- › In order to improve Qatar's image as a reliable humanitarian actor in the region and beyond and to compete with its Gulf neighbors in the field of humanitarianism, a number of development organizations have been established since 2005. Such engagement increased tremendously during the "Arab Uprisings" when Qatar started to financially support Islamist movements in Egypt and Tunisia to counterbalance the status quo powers Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
- › Under the leadership of Emir Hamad's successor, his son Sheikh Tamim, Qatar's foreign policy approach became less assertive, and the country currently serves as a hub for international negotiations. In this regard, Qatar's humanitarianism became more pragmatic and professional. The Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) which was initially established in 2002 as a unit within the Foreign Ministry became fully operational in 2015. Since then, QFFD has become the hub for Qatar's humanitarian efforts and serves as an umbrella organization for other Qatari development organizations and is managing Qatar's ODA.
- › Similar to other Gulf monarchies, decision-making regarding development cooperation in Qatar is highly opaque and is concentrated within the inner circle of the Emir and his closest advisors. One notable figure in Qatar's humanitarian efforts is Sheikha Moza, who plays a very important role in Qatar's humanitarianism as she is the chairwoman of the boards of several Qatari development organizations that are affiliated with Qatar Foundation.
- › Humanitarian relief is highly significant in Qatar's aid policy with a special focus on crisis-torn countries such as the Palestinian Territories, Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia. Financial support for Egypt ceased when the government of President Muhammad Mursi was toppled in summer 2013.
- › Humanitarian assistance has also been provided to non-Arab states such as Japan and Haiti in times of natural catastrophes such as floods or earthquakes.
- › During the Gulf rift, Qatar started to engage its humanitarian efforts in countries to which Saudi Arabia and the UAE did not establish close ties such as in East and West Africa. However, this engagement resulted in competition among the Gulf rivals at that time which also intensified the polarization and politicization of aid policies in countries in which the Gulf rift played out such as Sudan, Ethiopia or Somalia.
- › Qatar is focusing more on the provision of technical assistance compared to its Gulf neighbours. As Qatar has established itself as a hub for education, youth and female empowerment, the provision of scholarships, capacity development and training courses have become fundamental pillars of Qatar's humanitarianism.
- › As part of Qatar's drive for aid professionalization, it has recruited technical expertise from across the world to improve administrative structures of Qatar's development organizations. This is being done to promote multilateral partnerships and seek for development alliances. Similar to other policy fields, Qatar's development cooperation is an integral part of its nation branding and its efforts to put Qatar on the global map.
- › Consequently, the main sectors of focus for Qatar are education, health and economic empowerment, rather than infrastructure and transportation. Furthermore, new regions, particularly in Africa, have become more relevant where Qatar aims to establish itself as a champion of humanitarianism. In this regard, proactive outreach to international donors have intensified in order to promote multilateral partnerships.

- › In April 2016, Qatar became a participant to the OECD DAC to coordinate more closely with the international donor community. Since then, the different Qatari development organizations have formed partnerships with UN organizations and other international players.

Potential chances for closer cooperation with Qatar

- › During Germany's energy crisis, Qatar has become a more relevant political partner for Germany. In order to develop a multi-level bilateral partnership, Germany could engage in more comprehensive dialogue on development cooperation with Qatar. Cooperation in international development is one of the many fields in which German-Qatari relations may be fostered for mutual benefit. Instead of only focusing on economic and energy cooperation, closer dialogue on humanitarianism could provide an entry point to gain more political leverage on Qatar's decisionmaking.
- › The controversial debate about the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar and the need for energy diversification provide a momentum to improve political dialogue with Qatar. The new focus on Qatar offers an opportunity to expand the partnership beyond energy and focus on other policy fields such as development cooperation which also includes topics such as human development, social cohesion, youth empowerment and female empowerment.
- › In particular, Germany could engage with Qatar in migration management to improve the situation of labour migrants in their home countries by implementing joint projects in orientation, training and awareness raising campaigns.
- › Qatar is interested in improving its capacities on providing technical assistance both to beneficiary countries and within Qatar itself because local development figures prominently in Qatar's domestic political discourse. Germany and its development organisations are perceived as experienced players in this field. Therefore, capacity development may be an important strategic instrument in order to increase cooperation and dialogue. Several capacity development measures took place in recent years but not on a regular basis.
- › Germany and Qatar share an interest in SMEs and PPPs as instruments to create employment and thus tackle the challenge of youth unemployment, which is of great interest to Qatar in their work in other Arab states. Furthermore, health, education (particularly vocational education), employment generation re-

newable energies, energy efficiency, water management, combatting desertification and urban development (e.g. public transportation systems) are issues of interest to Qatar where Germany has expertise.

Potential challenges for closer cooperation with Qatar

- › Potential reputational risks remain high. As indicated by the controversial debate on Qatar during the World Cup in 2022, the German public critically assesses the human rights record, the exploitation of labor migrants, the situation of women and LGBTQI which could undermine any German efforts to enhance development cooperation with Qatar.
- › Furthermore, the political affiliation of some Arab donors with specific political actors is met with strong opposition in certain beneficiary countries, for which Qatar's long-term relations with the Muslim Brotherhood serve as an example. Accusations against specific Qatari development cooperations such as Qatar Charity exist, accusing them of their support for Islamist actors in Arab countries, Africa and even Europe and Germany.
- › As decision-making in Qatar heavily relies on the top level around the Emir, actions in development cooperation are oftentimes driven by adhoc decisions and overly ambitious goals. Against this backdrop, efforts to enhance closer project implementation between German and Qatari development organizations face complications due to mismatched financing mechanisms, political demands in terms of number of beneficiaries and administrative processes.

Volume of bilateral aid from Qatar (2011–2022)

	Total funding	2017	103,991,209
2011	17,114,624	2018	51,452,642
2012	104,942,844	2019	44,236,103
2013	108,711,194	2020	66,267,616
2014	155,674,458	2021	49,055,807
2015	103,344,980	2022	972,063
2016	44,085,114	Total	849,848,654

In USD; per year

Table 16 – Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service.
(last checked: 04.01.2023)

Target countries and regions of ODA for Qatar (from 2011–2022)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Afghanistan			16,385,838		1,135,691			1,999,920			853,743	
All other funding		100,000	1,016,348	50,000	5,903,223	441,778	6,344,037			17,558,122		
Bangladesh								2,621,242	1,577,267			
Cameroon		5,000,000									1,280,197	505,809
Chad	4,684,379		6,208,080							6,150,829		
Chile							5,000,000					
Costa Rica							1,000,000					
Ecuador							1,000,000					
Ethiopia							2,999,999			3,316,462		
Haiti						500,000						
Indonesia								400,000				
Iran, Islamic Republic of		25,705,605										
Iraq				3,095,890			5,649,891					214,557
Jordan		4,032,879	3,815,151	1,475,333	1,212,211	4,561,785			6,000,000	1,692,795	927,272	12,147
Lebanon		3,470,027	547,117	43,925,643	5,053,561	4,322,419	1,108,593	1,000,000	3,000,000	11,755,922	2,633,585	
Libya	100,000					10,013,819	3,260,975	8,000,000				
Mauritania	49,982				1,451,803							
Mozambique	5,800,463								3,000,000			
Myanmar	5,653,689		1,500,000									
Nigeria	49,982								200,000			
Not specified	5,800,463	46,178,829	65,514,896	3,375,000			37,220,000		2,000,000	5,357,995	17,202,976	
Palestinian territory			1,155,704	43,492,996	2,191,425	428,457		449,799	13,000,000	6,000,000		
Pakistan				379,999		258,000						239,550
Papua New Guinea								100,000				
Philippines											294,196	
Somalia	5,653,689	1,100,531			1,401,015						1,844,908	
South Sudan						1,011,005				3,268,629		
Sudan		5,494,505	4,512,632	4,434,000	1,178,271	1,141,634				3,004,053	2,221,430	
Syrian Arab Republic	283,712	119,973	5,576,115	15,059,343	12,404,108	17,728,417	34,153,015	11,049,439	12,637,786	6,757,470	19,156,161	
Turkey	542,399	473,765	2,479,313	38,661,254	9,262,354							
Yemen		13,266,730		1,725,000	62,151,318	3,677,800	1,254,699	8,832,162	2,821,050	1,405,339	2,629,251	

In USD; per country

Table 17 – Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

Pledges and disbursements to international and multilateral organizations from Qatar (from 2011–2022)

Recipient organization	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
All other funding	3,787,065	51,375,473		48,872,995	53,660,135	1,079,860	14,389,227	7,422,623	6,735,267	21,283,448	9,130,086	
Central Emergency Response Fund	4,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000						2,000,000			
Chad, Government of	4,684,379											
Eid Charity	2,352,345											
International NGOs (Confidential)						11,086,716						
Irshad and Islah Society Lebanon					207,662							
Not specified			86,320,212									
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs							40,220,000				15,999,955	
Palestinian territory										6,000,000		
Qatar Charity	1,132,868						4,049,678	9,549,439	11,637,786		8,575,937	
Qatar Red Crescent Society		18,266,730	18,390,982	49,569,510	43,479,744							
Sheikh Thani Bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services	1,157,967											
Somalia Relive Centre		1,100,531					23,450,765					
Sudan Medical Care		5,494,505										
Syria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund				19,999,960		5,000,000						
United Nations Children's Fund				6,000,000		1,000,000		3,000,000				12,147
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization										10,041,511		
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees				26,231,993	3,271,843				7,000,000	15,646,816	4,861,020	720,366
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East			1,000,000					9,887,304	14,000,000		6,999,999	
World Food Programme					1,255,249	632,650		7,733,938	2,863,050			239,550
World Health Organization										6,559,669		

In USD; per institution

Table 18 – Source: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service. (last checked: 04.01.2023)

Bilateral governmental organizations

Saudi Fund for Development

<i>Director/ Head of the Board</i>	It is managed by a ten-member Board of Directors Ahmed bin Aqeel Al-Khateeb, Chairman of the Board of Directors Sultan Abdulrahman Al-Marshad, acting CEO
<i>Headquarters, year of establishment</i>	Riyadh, founded in 1974
<i>Main sectors</i>	Transport and communication (especially transport – roads), Social Infrastructure (especially education and health), Agriculture, Energy
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa › OPEC Fund for International Development › Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development
<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › SFD contributes to these projects by providing soft loans. › Its activity is not geographically restricted, and it also deals directly with the governments of the developing countries in order to contribute to financing the priority development projects. › SFD prioritizes the financing of the least developed and low-income countries. <p>SDF Loan conditions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › The project to be financed in the recipient country shall be proved economically or socially feasible. › The finance of the entire project for which the loan is provided shall be available. › The loan shall be disbursed and repaid in Saudi Riyal. › The loan amount granted to any project shall not exceed 5% of the Fund's capital. › The total loan amounts granted to any country in one time shall not exceed 10% of SFD's capital.
<i>Main target countries</i>	<p>Overall target regions: Africa (382 projects, mainly roads, agricultural projects), Asia (261 projects, mainly roads, energy and education projects)</p> <p>Overall Amount of Funded Projects per country: Egypt – 32; Tunisia – 30; Senegal – 28; Bangladesh – 27; Yemen – 24; Morocco – 22; Jordan – 21; Lebanon – 21; Sudan – 21; Mauritania – 19; Algeria – 18; China – 18; Guinea – 16; Mali – 16; Sri Lanka – 15; Burkina Faso – 14; Djibouti – 14; Maldives – 14; Pakistan – 14; Syria – 14; Burundi – 13; Kenya – 13; Indonesia – 12; Vietnam – 12</p> <p>Since 1975, financed 733 development loans to finance 695 development projects and programs for the benefit of 84 developing countries worldwide.</p>
<i>Number of projects in 2021 (if not stated otherwise)</i>	<p>Three signed and seven approved projects by the board</p> <p>2021 projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Kenya Samatar-Wajir Road, loan amount USD 20 million › Sierra Leone Education Sector Support, loan amount USD 25 million › Albania Rehabilitation and Construction of Facilities Adjacent to the Coastal Road (Vlore-Orikom), loan amount USD 30 million

- Annual Budget*
- › SFD provided assistance amounted to USD 184 billion until 2021.
 - › SFD has commenced its activity with a capital of USD 2.6 billion provided by the Saudi government. This capital had then been increased in three phases to reach USD 8.2 billion.
 - › Two financing agreements with International Development Association (IDA), with a total amount of USD 253 million.

Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development

<i>Director / Head of the Board</i>	Dr. Ahmed Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-Sabah, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Foreign Minister and Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Abdulwahab Ahmad Al-Bader, Director General
<i>Headquarters, year of establishment</i>	Kuwait City, founded in 1962
<i>Main sectors</i>	<p>2020–2021: Water and sewage sector 39.3%, energy sector with 25.5%, social sector 16.9%, transport and communication sector 11.8%, agriculture sector 6.5%.</p> <p>2017–2022: Multi-sector – USD 86,600,000; Emergency Shelter and NFI – USD 4,050,000; Water Sanitation Hygiene – USD 400,000; Health – USD 200,000; Agriculture – USD 875,000; Food Security – USD 275,000</p>
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	<p>Contribution to INGOs/ Partner organizations 2020–2021:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development USD 547 million › Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa USD 46 million › African Development Fund USD 278 million (committed) USD 273 million (paid) › The Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation USD 6.5 million › African Development Bank USD 880 million (committed) USD 30.8 million (paid) › International Development Association USD 527 million (committed) USD 391 million (paid) › International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) USD 128 million (committed) USD 92.4 million (paid) › Arab Gulf Program for Development (AGFUND) USD 47.6 million <p>Recipient organizations 2017–2022:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › All other funding USD 2,192,430 › Bangladesh Red Crescent Society USD 400,000 › Children Cancer Centre of Lebanon USD 2,000,000 › Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations USD 1,000,000 › Jordan, Government of USD 30,000,000 › Lebanon, Government of USD 30,000,000 › Turkey, Government of USD 20,000,000 › United Nations Children's Fund USD 5,807,570 › UNHCR USD 2,000,000 › United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East USD 25,500,000 › World Health Organization USD 3,000,000

<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Making loans and providing guarantees › Making grants by way of technical assistance and providing other types of technical assistance › Contributing to capital stocks of international and regional development finance institutions and other development institutions and representing the State of Kuwait in such institutions
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Recipients:

- › Central and provincial governments, public utilities and other public corporations
- › Development institutions, whether international, regional or national and, in particular, development finance institutions.
- › Corporate entities that undertake projects which are jointly owned by a number of developing countries as well as mixed or private enterprises.

<i>Main target countries</i>	2017–2022: Lebanon – USD 38,000,000; Jordan – USD 30,000,000; Turkey – USD 20,000,000; Palestinian territories – USD 7,000,000; Yemen – USD 5,000,000; Bangladesh – USD 1,050,000
<i>Number of projects in 2021 (if not stated otherwise)</i>	2020–2021: 19 projects with a total loan commitment of about USD 816 million covering, transport, energy, agriculture, water and sewerage, in addition to the social sector. The recipient countries included 6 Arab countries, 7 African countries, one country in the Southeast Asia and Pacific region, one country in the Europe and Central Asia region, and two countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region. Share of commitment: Arab – 71.4%; African – 17.5%; East, South Asian and Pacific Country – 4.1%, Latin American and Caribbean countries – 4%, Central Asian and European countries – 3%.
<i>Annual Budget</i>	2017–2022: 2017 – USD 5,000,000; 2019 – USD 90,000,000; 2021 – USD 11,500,000; 2022 – USD 15,400,000

Abu Dhabi Fund for Development

<i>Director/ Head of the Board</i>	Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Board Chairman, Deputy Prime Minister of the UAE Mohamed Saif Al Suwaidi, Director General
<i>Headquarters, year of establishment</i>	Abu Dhabi, founded in 1971
<i>Main sectors</i>	Infrastructure, transport, housing, agriculture, water, industry and renewable energy, as well as service sectors such as education, health and tourism
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › IRENA/ADFD › Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank › Live and Livelihoods Fund › UAE-Pacific Partnership Fund › Arab Coordination Group › UAE-Caribbean Renewable Energy Fund

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Asian Development Bank › Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau › OECD
<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Provision of soft loans and administration of government grants › Abu Dhabi Fund invests in various companies and private portfolios in many developing countries in partnership with the public and private sectors, holding shares ranging from full to partial ownership
<i>Main target countries</i>	<p>Overall funding: Asia – USD 17.4 billion; Africa – USD 8.4 billion; Europe – 10.4 billion AED; Americas USD – 243 million; Oceania – USD 65 Million</p>
<i>Number of projects in 2021 (if not stated otherwise)</i>	<p>In 2021, ADFD signed agreements to provide soft loans worth USD 175 million for six development projects to be implemented in five countries including Rwanda, Turkmenistan, the Maldives, Lesotho and Guinea. The projects comprised strategic sectors such as energy, transport and water.</p> <p>2021 provided a total of USD 27.6 million to the Comoros, Ethiopia, Uzbekistan, and Mauritania.</p>
<i>Annual Budget</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › USD 175 million total loans › USD 27.6 million total grants

Qatar Fund for Development

<i>Director/ Head of the Board</i>	Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, Chairman of the Board, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Khalifa bin Jassem Al-Kuwari, Director General
<i>Headquarters, year of establishment</i>	Doha, founded in 2002 as Qatar Development Fund (QDF) and became operational in 2015 as QFFD
<i>Main sectors</i>	Education, Infrastructure, Economic Development, Healthcare, Humanitarian Aid, Budget Support
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › UNRWA › Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) › Adaptation Fund › Qatar Red Crescent › Qatar Charity › Lebanon's Care Society › The Carter Center › The Global Fund to Fight AIDS › Tomorrow's Youth Organization › ILO › UN Darfur Fund (UNDF) › UNDP › UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) › QUEST Health › Initiative › UNHCR

- › Gavi
- › Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
- › UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- › United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)
- › Office of the Secretary- General Youth Envoy
- › WHO
- › SPARK
- › Lives & Livelihoods Fund (LLF)
- › Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF)
- › USAID

*Financing mechanisms/
modes of delivery*

In 2021, QFFD contributed over USD 551 million internationally towards development and humanitarian assistance, channelling these funds through its partners, including multilateral institutions, and global and local civil society organizations.

Based on bilateral and multilateral agreements, QFFD is fully committed to providing external aid through a variety of financial instruments including grants, soft loans, commercial loans, guarantees and development investments, according to best practices and professional standards.

Main target countries

Funding countries 2021:

Oceania – Kiribatt; Europe – Albania, Germany;
Americas – Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines;
Sub-Saharan Africa – Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia;
MENA – Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinian Territories, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Somalia, Tunisia, Yemen; Asia – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Iran, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Tajikistan, Turkey

*Number of projects in 2021
(if not stated otherwise)*

n/a

Annual Budget

- › USD 551,088,314
- › Education – USD 99,981,775
- › Infrastructure – USD 3,920,222
- › Economic Development – USD 22,364,275
- › Healthcare – USD 70,267,877
- › Humanitarian Aid – USD 345,304,166
- › Budget Support – USD 84,266,118

Selected non-governmental or semi-governmental organizations

Qatar Charity	
<i>Director/ Head of the Board</i>	Hamad bin Nasser Al Thani, Chairman Yousef bin Ahmed Al-Kuwari, Chief Executive Officer
<i>Headquarters, year of establishment</i>	Energy City, Lusail, Qatar, founded in 1992
<i>Main sectors</i>	<p>Humanitarian Assistance and Development Programs: Protecting children and families, Safeguarding refugees and IDPS, Sustainable and inclusive development, Promoting cohesive societies, Local community development</p> <p>Special focus on: Gender Equality, Climate change, People with disabilities, Localization and capacity-building</p>
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › The UN Department Of Global Communication › The Core Humanitarian Standards Alliance › The UN Economic And Social Council › IOM › The Start Network › UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) › UNICEF
<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › QC's activities are financed mainly through private donations raised from public campaigns, religious donations (zakat and sadaqa), membership fees, and income derived from religious endowments (waqf). › Only 5% of its project budget is currently covered by government grants provided by QFFD. › Additional finance comes from UN agencies that use QC as an implementer in the field of humanitarian assistance.
<i>Main target countries</i>	<p>Field Offices: Africa – Comoros Islands, Djibouti, The Gambia, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia; Asia – Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Yemen; Europe – Albania; Bosnia And Herzegovina, Kosovo, Turkey;</p>
<i>Number of projects in 2021 (if not stated otherwise)</i>	In 2020 implemented projects in 44 countries: Middle East – 6; Europe – 5; Africa – 24; Asia – 9;
<i>Annual Budget</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › In 2020 Total Expenditure 401,601,845 USD › 26% for Humanitarian Programs, 74% for Development Programs

King Salman Center for Humanitarian Relief

<i>Director/ Head of the Board</i>	Abdullah A. Al Rabeeah, Supervisor General (former Minister of Health 2009-2014)
<i>Headquarters, year of establishment</i>	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, founded in 2015
<i>Main sectors</i>	Food Security, Health, Nutrition, Education, Water and Environmental Sanitation, (WASH), Protection, Shelter and Non-food Items, Multi-sectors (which includes various types of relief aid), and Early Recovery
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › United States Agency for International Development › UK Department for International Development › FAO › International Committee of the Red Cross › International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies › International Medical Corps UK › IOM › OCHA › Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights › UNDP › United Nations Population Fund › UNHCR › UNICEF › WFP › WHO › UNRWA
<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Mainly provision of grants › KSRelief is only engaged as a financier of implementing local institutions and plans projects after an internal evaluation process done by its Operational Support Department (OSD).
<i>Main target countries</i>	Active in 86 countries Yemen, Palestinian Territories, Syria, Somalia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nigeria
<i>Number of projects in 2021 (if not stated otherwise)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › 2022 – 248 projects with a volume of USD 288 million › 2021 – 360 projects with a volume of USD 645 million › 2020 – 266 projects with a volume of USD 546 million
<i>Annual Budget</i>	n/a

Silatech

<i>Director/ Head of the Board</i>	Sheikha Moza bint Nasser, Chairperson of the Board of Trustees (wife of former Emir Hamad bin Khalifa and mother of Emir Tamim bin Hamad, founder of Qatar Foundation) Hassan Al-Mulla, CEO
<i>Headquarters,</i>	Doha, Qatar, founded in 2008,

<i>year of establishment</i>	17 local offices
<i>Main sectors</i>	Promotion of job creation, entrepreneurship, and access to capital and markets for young people by providing comprehensive and innovative solutions in the field of youth employment Capacity development and technical assistance Sectors: Enterprise Development, Employment, Policy and Research
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	<p>Selected governmental partners:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Qatar Charity › QFFD › USAID › EU <p>Selected UN agencies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › UNDP › UNRWA › ILO › UNHCR › WHO › World Bank Group <p>Selected non-governmental organizations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › OECD › Qatar Red Crescent › CARE › MercyCorps <p>Selected private sector organizations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Microsoft › Ooredoo › Boeing › JP Morgan
<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Grants, lending/financing, investment › Silatech contribution in any project should not exceed 25% (1:3 leverage). › Cost per job should not exceed USD 90 on Silatech (the cost may be greater and the difference will be covered from the contribution of other partners). › Partners contribution may include an in-kind value (such as office rent, training rooms, salaries, etc.) in addition to cash contribution. › Silatech contribution should cover training activities and placement mechanism.
<i>Main target countries</i>	17 countries Algeria, Comoros, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen
<i>Number of projects in 2021 (if not stated otherwise)</i>	n/a
<i>Annual Budget</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Silatech has no independent budget but receives institutional funding plus project funding from the Qatar Fund for Development. › From 2008–2018, Silatech received USD 78.6 million from the State of Qatar, along with a USD 108 million seed fund from the founders › Co-financing from partners: USD 659 million › grants from partners: USD 36.4 million

Education Above All	
<i>Director/ Head of the Board</i>	Sheikha Moza bint Nasser, Chairperson of the Board of Trustees (wife of former Emir Hamad bin Khalifa and mother of Emir Tamim bin Hamad, founder of Qatar Foundation) Fahad Al-Sulaiti, CEO
<i>Headquarters, year of establishment</i>	Doha, Qatar, founded in 2012
<i>Main sectors</i>	<p>Education and vocational training with a focus on out-of-school-children (OOSC); provision of scholarships; access to education programs for marginalized youth; capacity development; also, EAA acts as an umbrella organization for "Educate A Child" (EAC), "Protect Education in Insecurity and Conflict" (PEIC), "Al Fakhoora", "Together Project", "Reach out to Asia" (ROTA).</p> <p>EAC: access to primary education for OOSC, PEIC: PEIC focuses its activities on policy, research and advocacy; organization of seminars, trainings and workshops Al Fakhoora: in its scholarship program, AF provides access to quality education, to student services and offers civic engagement options for the beneficiaries, Together Project: Launched in 2017 under EAA's Al Fakhoora program, the project works towards providing equitable access to education for children across communities in Qatar and other countries, ROTA: systematic inclusion and engagement of marginalized youth (including those affected by poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, crisis and displacement) in sustainable development agendas due to not being recognized by stakeholders (including themselves) as key contributors to local, national and global development, peace-building/conflict-resolution, green skills, humanitarian action, climate action, youth leadership, community development</p>
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	<p>Strategic partners:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › QFFD › Bharti › UNESCO › UNHCR › UNICEF › UNRWA <p>Public partners:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › BMZ (MoU in 2013) › QFFD › AFD › Inter-American Development Bank › IsDB › KOICA › UK Department for International Development › USAID › World Bank Group
<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › EAA and its programs work through the provision of finance to established education approaches and on-going interventions of aid organizations. › Between 2012 and 2018, the co-financing share of the partner was 64% on average.

- › So far, its main funding mechanisms have been multi-year co-funding agreements with other organizations in which EAA contributed a maximum of 50% of the finance.
- › EAA receives its financial share from QFFD. QFFD has asked EAA to reduce its share to 25% through finding additional partners that enter into co-financing schemes. Currently, the financing ratio is 70/30.

<i>Main target countries</i>	<p>2020:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › EAC – 53 countries in 80 projects › ROTA – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories, Philippines, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen › Together – Qatar, India, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, Zambia › Al Fakhoora – Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Syria, Turkey
<i>Number of projects in 2021 (if not stated otherwise)</i>	<p>By SDGs:</p> <p>No poverty – 41 projects in 41 countries; Good health and well-being – 44 projects in 45 countries; Decent work and economic growth – 11 projects in 14 countries; Gender equality – 60 projects in 50 countries; Quality education – 87 projects in 65 countries; Zero hunger – 21 projects in 31 countries; Climate action – 11 projects in 13 countries; Peace, justice, and strong institutions – 27 projects in 35 countries; Clean water and sanitation – 34 projects in 31 countries; Partnerships for the goals – 48 projects in 46 countries; Reduced inequalities: 28 projects in 48 countries</p>
<i>Annual Budget</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Actual costs 2020 – USD 279,212 › Al Fakhoora – USD 30,172 (11%) › EAC – USD 156,969 (56%) › PEIC – USD 3,567 (1%) › ROTA – USD 23,093 (8%) › Innovation Development – USD 3,137 (1%) › EAA Projects (Mauritania and Qatar Red Crescent) – USD 5,508 (2%) › External relations – USD 1,572 (1%) › Fundraising – USD 5,020 (1%) › Administration – USD 50,375 (18%)

Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences

<i>Director/ Head of the Board</i>	Amir Sheikh Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Chairman Crown Prince Sheikh Meshal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah Dr. Khaled Ali Al-Fadhel, Director General
<i>Headquarters, year of establishment</i>	Kuwait City, private non-profit organisation founded in 1976
<i>Main sectors</i>	Foster science, technology, and innovation, Renewable energy and energy efficiency through in-house research and the advancement of young Kuwaiti and Arab scientists through scholarships, Training programs for private companies' employees, Support of scientific projects and programs.
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	UN organizations such as UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR

<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Mainly research grants › Funding from Kuwaiti private sector companies
<i>Main target countries</i>	active mainly inside Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, Syrian refugees
<i>Number of projects in 2021 (if not stated otherwise)</i>	n/a
<i>Annual Budget</i>	n/a

Dubai Cares

<i>Director/ Head of the Board</i>	Reem Al Hashimy, Chairperson, UAE Minister of State for International Cooperation Dr. Tariq Al Gurg, CEO
<i>Headquarters, year of establishment</i>	Dubai, founded in 2007 and part of Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Global Initiatives
<i>Main sectors</i>	<p>Early childhood development</p> <p>Access to quality primary and secondary education</p> <p>Technical and vocational education</p> <p>Training for youth as well as a particular focus on education in emergencies and protracted crises</p>
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) › United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) › Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation › Plan International › World Food Programme › Pratham › Idara-e-Taleem-o-Agahi › Associates in Research and Education for Development (ARED) › Save the Children, International Rescue Committee and CARE
<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	Co-financing
<i>Main target countries</i>	<p>MENA – Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen; Asia – Cambodia, Nepal, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Vietnam;</p> <p>Africa – Malawi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Zimbabwe;</p> <p>Latin America – Paraguay, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru; Others – Kiribati, Comores, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Vanuatu, Bosnia & Herzegovina</p>
<i>Number of projects in 2021 (if not stated otherwise)</i>	n/a
<i>Annual Budget</i>	n/a

Multilateral organizations

Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)

IDB Group (IsDBG) has evolved into a group of five entities, consisting of Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), Islamic Research & Training Institute (IRTI), Islamic Corporation for Development of the Private Sector (ICD), Islamic Corporation for Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC) and International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC), Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development (ISFD)

It has 57 member states across the world.

All members are at the same time members of the OIC.

The IsDB has eleven regional hubs.

<i>Director/ Head of the Board</i>	Dr. Muhammad Sulaiman Al Jasser, President
<i>Headquarters, year of establishment</i>	Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, founded in 1975
<i>Main sectors</i>	<p>IsDBG Main Sectors 2021: Combating the Pandemic and Poverty; Building Green, Resilient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Economies; Improving Institutional Effectiveness</p> <p>ICIEC: Promoting trade and investment, support exports, imports, and foreign direct investments; Enhancing economic prosperity, development, and diversification</p> <p>Main ICIEC Sectors: Science, technology, and innovation (STI); Infrastructure; Education; Health; Humanitarian Relief; Women & Girls</p> <p>ICD 2021 Main Sectors: Finance 49.92%; Health & Other Social Services 11.08%; Industry & Mining 18.47% Transportation 20.53%</p> <p>ISFD main Sectors: Human development (education, health, water, and sanitation); Agricultural and rural development; Basic rural Infrastructure development; Capacity building; Women and youth empowerment</p> <p>ISFD 2021: Health sector 38%; Education 15%; Agriculture 15% ; Water, sanitation, and urban services 9%; Energy 5%</p> <p>IsDBI: Technical assistance; Data provision; Capacity-Building</p> <p>Trilateral cooperation: Reverse Linkage Program</p>

<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Bilateral and multilateral Arab development institutions that are grouped in the ACG › World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development › WFP, UNICEF, IFAD, FAO, UNDP › JICA, DFID, AFD, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation › GIZ (MoU was renewed in 2020)
<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	<p>ICIEC: Shari'ah-compliant export credit and investment insurance to reduce the risk of doing business for prospective trade partners, businesses, and investors across its 48 MSs</p> <p>ISFD: Of the USD 62.6 million that the ISFD approved in 2021, USD 31 million went to member countries in the form of concessional loans, while USD 31.6 million went as grants</p>
<i>Main target countries</i>	<p>61% to Sub-Saharan Africa, 30% to Asia, Latin America and Europe, 9% to MENA</p> <p>ISDBG Countries Overall 2021: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bassao, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somali, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Yemen</p> <p>ICIEC 2021 support: 48 countries across Muslim world</p> <p>ICD countries: Australia, Bahrain Indonesia, KSA, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, UAE, UK</p> <p>ISFD 2021: Sub-Saharan Africa 61%, Asia, Latin America and Europe 30%, MENA 9%.</p>
<i>Number of projects in 2021</i>	<p>Health sector – 38%; Education – 15%; Agriculture –15% ; Water, sanitation and urban services – 9%; Energy – 5%</p>
<i>Annual Budget</i>	<p>ISDBG Total 2021: Net approvals USD 733 million</p> <p>ICIEC 2021: USD 9,797 Million - Support for trade and investments ICIEC USD 7,556 Million - Support for exports and imports ICIEC USD 2,241 Million - Support for foreign direct investments</p> <p>ICIEC Overall: Cumulative amount of USD 83.3 billion USD 66.13 billion represents support for trade, while USD 17.18 billion for foreign direct investments.</p> <p>ICD 2021: Total approvals USD 243.60 million</p>

ITFC 2021:

95 transactions worth, USD 6.5 billion of trade finance, benefitting 21 member countries
 USD 810 million for food security
 USD 250 million agricultural redistribution
 Private Sector Development financing USD 139 million
 Energy Sector financing USD 3.8 billion

ISFD Fund 2021:

USD 62.6 million

The OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)

*Director/
of the Board*

Dr. Abdulhamid Alkhalifa, Director-General

*Headquarters,
year of establishment*

Vienna, Austria, founded in 1976

Main sectors

› Food, energy, clean water and sanitation, healthcare and education

Spending in 2021:

- › Public Sector USD 685,500,000
- › Trade USD 353,026,780
- › Private Sector USD 473,923,000

Sectors in 2021:

- › Banking & Financial Services USD 496,067,500
- › Multi-sector / Cross-Cutting USD 245,500,000
- › Transport & Storage USD 205,000,000
- › Health USD 15,000,000
- › Trade Finance & General Programme Assistance USD 201,932,600
- › Agriculture USD 175,922,900
- › Energy Generation Distribution & Efficiency USD 153,026,780
- › Water & Sanitation USD 20,000,000

*Main international
partner organizations*

Co-Financiers in 2021:

- › Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD)
- › Adaptation Fund (AF)
- › African Development Bank (AfDB)
- › Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)
- › Asian Development Bank (ADB)
- › Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
- › Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)
- › ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development
- › European Investment Bank (EIB)
- › Green Climate Fund (GCF)
- › Heifer International
- › Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
- › International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
- › International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
- › International Monetary Fund (IMF)
- › Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)
- › Kühne Foundation

- › Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED)
- › Netherlands Enterprise Agency (ROV)
- › Saudi Fund for Development (SFD)
- › UK Department for International Development (DFID)
- › United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- › World Bank Group
- › World Food Programme (WFP)

Privat Sector and Trade Finance Co-Financiers in 2021:

- › African Development Bank (AfDB)
- › Arab Bank
- › Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
- › Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH (DEG)
- › European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
- › Green Climate Fund (GCF)
- › International Finance Corporation
- › International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC)
- › Standard Chartered Bank

*Financing mechanisms/
modes of delivery*

- › Loans for development projects and programs
- › Financing private-sector activities in developing countries
- › Providing grants in support of technical assistance, food aid, research and similar activities, and humanitarian emergency relief
- › Contributing to the resources of other development institutions whose work benefits developing countries

Main target countries

By region:

Africa USD 870,749,780; Asia USD 465,000,000; Latin America, the Caribbean USD 176,700,000

Commitments in 2021:

Africa – Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia Uganda; **Latin America & the Caribbean** – Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay; **Asia** – Armenia, Bangladesh, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Uzbekistan, Vietnam

*Number of projects
in 2021*

47 projects

Annual Budget

- › USD 1.5 billion in 2021
- › USD 1 billion COVID-19 response facility was fully utilized by the end of 2021.

Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD or Arab Fund)

*Director/
Head of the Board*

Bader M. Alsaad, Director General/Chairman of the Board of Directors

*Headquarters,
year of establishment*

Kuwait City, Kuwait, founded in 1968

<i>Main sectors</i>	<p>Implementing high-priority economic and social projects</p> <p>Lending program: infrastructure projects aimed at providing basic services, increasing production capacity, improving the investment environment in Arab countries, and upgrading existing projects.</p> <p>Grants to Arab countries and joint Arab projects for institutional support and training, implementing emergency programs, and organizing seminars and conferences, in addition to providing support to the Palestinian people through the Urgent Program</p> <p>Loan Sectors 1974–2021: Transport & Telecommunication 26.6%, Agriculture and Rural Development 13.4%, Other Sectors 2.7%, Social Services Sectors 9.0%, Water and Sewerage 13.3%, Industry and Mining 3.8%, Energy and Electricity 30.3%</p> <p>2021 grants: About 49.8% was allocated to support emergency programs, 48.8% for institutional support and training, and 1.4% for seminars and conferences</p> <p>Joint Grants Sectors 1974–2021: Feasibility Studies and Project Preparation 8.2%, Institutional Support and Training 62.8%, General Studies and Research 17.0%, Emergency Programs 4.2%, Seminars and Conferences 7.8%</p> <p>Grants Sectors 1974–2021: Institutional Support and Training 48.4%, Emergency Programs 37.5%, Feasibility Studies and Project Preparation 10.3%, General Studies and Research 3.7%, Seminars and Conferences 0.1%</p>
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	<p>Co-financing activities with National and Regional Development Institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development › Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development › Abu Dhabi Fund for Development › Saudi Fund for Development › Islamic Development Bank › OPEC Fund for International Development › Iraqi Fund for External Development › Libyan Foreign Bank <p>Co-financing activities with International Financial Institutions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › World Bank › International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) › African Development Bank
<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Lending program › Grants › Urgent Program › Arab Fund Fellowship Program, which aims to provide opportunities for Arab competencies to conduct advanced research and/or lecture at prestigious universities and research centres
<i>Main target countries</i>	<p>Two loans in 2021: Kingdom of Bahrain (public sector) and State of Kuwait (private sector)</p> <p>Grants for Arab countries: Iraq, Lebanon – 3, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Yemen – 2, Sudan</p>

<i>Number of projects in 2021</i>	Number of Loans Approved 2021 – 2 Number of Grants provided 2021 – 6 Total Number of Grants – 1269
<i>Annual Budget</i>	Total Amount of Loans Approved 2021 – USD 33.7 million Total Amount of Grants provided 2021 – USD 4.5 million Cumulative Amount of Approved Loans – USD 36 billion Cumulative Grant Commitment – USD 820 million
Arab Gulf Programme for Development (AGFUND)	
	AGFUND has established five specialized development organizations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> › Arab Council for Childhood and Development › Arab Women Center for Training and Research › Financial Inclusion Banks › Arab Open University › Arab Network for NGOs
<i>Director/ Head of the Board</i>	Prince Talal Bin Abdul Aziz, President Nasser bin Bakr Al-Qahtani, Executive Director
<i>Headquarters, year of establishment</i>	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, founded in 1980
<i>Main sectors</i>	Main programmes: Early Childhood Development, Women's Empowerment, Civil Society Development, Education, Financial Inclusion Total number of projects with UN Organisations – 638 Total number of projects for females and children – 1626
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> › IsDB › SCBF › Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft › Syngenta › Symbiotics › GIZ › Social Performance Taskforce › The Open University › International Youth Fellowship › OCHA WHO › UNHCR › UNDP › UNICEF › UNESCO › UNITAR › Union of Arab Banks › Efe › Friends international › Helen Keller intl › Arab Aid › Arab Monetary Fund

- › Qatar Fund for Development
- › BADEA
- › Abu Dhabi Fund for Development
- › BDEAC
- › OECD
- › SFD
- › Kuwait Fund for Development
- › Arab Fund for Economic & Social Development
- › OPEC Fund
- › UNRWA
- › Business Call to Action
- › ACG

<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	Grants, co-funding, parallel funding, and equity operations for AGFUND's microfinance institutions; Support of Arab Open University
<i>Main target countries</i>	Total number of funded projects – 1,582 Africa – 633, Asia – 913, Europe – 20, South America – 13, North America – 3
<i>Number of projects in 2021</i>	Total funds – USD 345 Million
<i>Annual Budget</i>	n/a

Arab Monetary Fund (AMF)

<i>Director/ Head of the Board</i>	Dr. Abdulrahman A. Al Hamidy, Director General Chairman of the Board
<i>Headquarters, year of establishment</i>	Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, founded in 1976
<i>Main sectors</i>	Provide financial and technical support, Cooperation and exchanging of experiences in the field of monetary and fiscal policies, Coordination among Arab central banks and monetary authorities, Technical Assistance, Training program, Research Loan Sectors 1978–2021: Structural adjustment facility – 56.7%, financial and banking sector and public finance sector – 34.6%, trade reform facility – 2.4 %, oil facility framework to total loans – 1.2 %, framework facility to support a conducive ecosystem – 5.2 %
<i>Main international partner organizations</i>	› World Bank › IMF
<i>Financing mechanisms/ modes of delivery</i>	Technical assistance programs linked to the elaboration of policies and mechanisms related to the development of national cadres' capacities Develop payment systems and modern financial techniques as well as capital markets, economic databases, and national accounts statistics, and to foster efforts aiming at improving financial inclusion and other activities related to the Fund Providing short- and medium-term facilities to member countries

Issuing guarantees in favour of member countries
 Deposits from Arab Member Countries to be invested by the AMF on their behalf;
 all necessary arrangements for the management of any funds that a Member Country
 entrusts it with, in favour of other Arab or non-Arab parties

Main target countries

Loans approved 2021:

New loans to Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan – 2, the Republic of Tunisia – 1,
 the Kingdom of Morocco – 1, and the Arab Republic of Egypt – 1

*Number of projects
 in 2021*

Loans approved 2021: Five new loans

Technical Assistance 2021 areas:

Development of the financial, banking, and government bond markets infrastructure,
 and enhancing the capabilities of the Arab Countries to achieve financial coverage
 within the framework of activities, capacities in the development of economic statistics
 and applying the international statistical methodologies

Training program 2021:

Designed considering the challenges associated with the Covid-19 pandemic and
 its repercussions and how to deal with developments during the recovery phase of
 the pandemic

Annual Budget

Loans approved 2021:

Total value of USD 623 million to meet urgent financing needs and support economic and
 financial reform efforts in light of the current challenges.

Contact


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
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The Gulf monarchies Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Kuwait have emerged as significant international and regional providers of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation for decades. The study provides a detailed overview on the Gulf states' humanitarian and developmental engagement, analyses motivations, sectors, partner countries and trends, and outlines chances and challenges for enhanced cooperation with Gulf developmental actors.